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INTRODUCTION

There exist certain commonly received wisdoms about modern
free speech law that are centered around the content approach to
protecting free expression. One is that if a speech regulation is content-based, the Supreme Court will weigh the competing speech and
regulatory interests involved in a way that favors heavily the former
interests (applying so-called "strict scrutiny") and rarely uphold it. Another is that if such a regulation is content-neutral, focusing more on
the time, place, or manner of expressive activities, the Court will balance the competing interests involved in a more evenhanded fashion
(applying so-called "intermediate scrutiny") and may or may not uphold it depending on the outcome of that assessment. Yet another is
that the Court's decision in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,'
where it determined that a law which selectively restricted sexually explicit expression was content-neutral based on the so-called "secondary effects" doctrine, was an aberration and not generally followed by
the Court except in cases involving such expression. 2 Finally, it has
long been thought that the content approach to analyzing free speech
1 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
2

See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of

Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 49, 59-61 (2000)
(criticizing Renton for calling a content-based law "content-neutral," but limiting cri-
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cases makes good sense, in large part because it operates to ferret out
illegitimate government motives for restricting speech-in other
words, it reflects a basic distrust for government regulation of speech
based on its content-while at the same time giving the government
reasonable latitude to order and regulate expressive activities for non3
content-related reasons.
tique to "secondary effects" cases associated with restrictions on adult theatres and
entertainment establishments).
3 Although one can certainly debate the question of what constitutes legitimate
and illegitimate motives for restricting speech, in this Article I intend by the latter
concept a meaning that seems to best accord with the views of the Court on this
matter: a restriction on expression resulting mainly from an ideological, moralistic,
paternalistic, or self-interested disapproval of its content by government officials, instead of from a good faith and unbiased assessment of sufficiently harmful societal
consequences that the restricted content might reasonably be thought to cause. See,
e.g., Turner Broad. -Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (explaining that content-based laws "pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a
legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion"); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (asserting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"); Consol.
Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (asserting that "when a
regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited merely
because public officials disapprove the speaker's views"); see also Elena Kagan, Private
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U.

CHI. L. REv. 413, 428-32 (1996) (defining improperly motivated speech restrictions as
those resulting from governmental hostility, sympathy, or self-interest towards the
content of expression, rather than from "a neutral and legitimate evaluation" of
harmful consequences that the restricted content is perceived to cause). Of course, a
corollary of this principle is that "the government may not privilege either ideas it
favors or ideas advancing its self-interest-for example, by exempting certain ideas
from a general prohibition." Id. at 429.
Certainly a concern about improper governmental motivation is not the only justification for the content approach, and both the Court and commentators have suggested or offered additional explanations for it. An especially popular one is that
restrictions based on content are particularly troublesome because, regardless of motivating factors, they impair the proper functioning of the "marketplace of ideas"
more than restrictions directed at non content factors. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 54-57 (1987) [hereinafter Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions] (justifying the content approach on grounds that contentbased restrictions can make it difficult or impossible for certain ideas or views to enter
public debate in addition to justifying it on grounds of improper motive). But despite
the likelihood that this explanation, as well as others, might account in some part for
the content approach, I agree with Dean Kagan that a "concern with governmental
motive remains a hugely important-indeed, the most important-explanatory factor
in First Amendment law." Kagan, supra, at 415; see also id. at 443 (asserting that "rules
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This Article seeks to test these perceptions by taking an empirical
look at the Court's decisions that deal with basic regulations of private
speech or speech in public forums over the past thirty-four years-the
period since the Court gave birth to the content approach in Police
Department v. Mosley. 4 In other words, this Article focuses on free
speech decisions that have centered on the basic content approach,
and that are not influenced by special considerations that might favor
greater content regulation such as is usually the case with restrictions
on speech occurring in nonpublic forums, or restrictions placed on
government-funded or government-employee speech. 5 By focusing
... devised to flush out illicit purpose ... constitute the foundation stones of First
Amendment doctrine"). See infra notes 177-92 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of different explanations that have been offered for the content approach,
and whether they in fact justify current doctrine any better than a concern about
improper government motives.
Probably the most prominent defenses of the content distinction in First Amendment analysis have been written by Professor Stone. See Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentNeutralRestrictions, supra; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment,
25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation]; Geoffrey
R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter
Restrictions,46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978) [hereinafter Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions].
Probably its most prominent critique was authored by Professor Martin Redish. See
Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.
113 (1981). For additional commentaries on that distinction from a variety of perspectives, see, for example, Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content NeutralityDoctrine in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647,
650 n.17 (2002) (collecting commentaries). It should be noted that most of the
prominent commentaries in this area were written fairly early on in the development
of the content approach, and it is not clear to what extent their authors would adhere
to their original views given the significant changes that the doctrine has undergone
in more recent years as I will describe in this Article.
4 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
5 The government is generally granted greater latitude in these areas to regulate
speech on the basis of its content because it is acting in special capacities to achieve
certain purposes rather than acting in its sovereign capacity to regulate private speech
generally or in traditional or designated public forums (i.e., public places that have,
respectively, been traditionally dedicated to or deliberately opened for expressive ac-

tivities).

See, e.g.,

EUGENE VOLOKH, FIRST AMENDMENT AND

PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLicy

RELATED

STATUTES:

ARGUMENTS 359-61, 387-89, 400-02 (2d ed. 2005). Al-

though the government is given some latitude to control the subjects of speech that
may be addressed in designated public forums-to make sure they are consistent with
the purpose for which the forum has been created-beyond that, the same rules that
apply to content discrimination in traditional public forums or with respect to general
restrictions on private speech apply to speech in designated public forums. See id. at
388. 1 have also generally excluded from my analysis cases involving "unprotected"
speech such as obscenity, libel, or incitement, and the "lesser protected" category of
commercial speech, where with narrow exceptions the government is also given more
latitude to regulate speech on the basis of its content. See id. at 3-224. Further ex-
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on the operation of the content approach in its core field of application, it is hoped that its true features and characteristics can be isolated and analyzed free of extraneous considerations that might
6
otherwise skew such an evaluation.
When the Court's decisions are analyzed in this light, several
striking conclusions emerge that call into question the commonly
held assumptions identified above. The first is that instead of a
scheme that applies stringent versus evenhanded balancing depending on the presence or absence of content regulation, what has
emerged modernly is a bifurcated categorical content approach (or
what I shall call a "bicategorical content approach" for short). Under
this scheme, it is the initial content characterization of a regulation
that does all of the work in basic free speech cases, and if it is labeled
as "content-based" it is categorically invalidated, and if "content-neutral" it is almost categorically upheld. Remarkably, in every case since
Mosley where the Court made a determination that a regulation of
speech was content-based and applied strict or "exacting scrutiny" to
it, this sounded the death knell for it and each one has been struck
down. 7 Conversely, in the many cases in which the Court made a decluded are cases dealing with incidental restrictions on speech, where a regulation is

aimed at general conduct but may indirectly burden expressive activities. See, e.g.,
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986). The Court may or may not subject
such restrictions to any form of scrutiny since the government is generally not regulat-

ing speech at all, unless of course they are being used to suppress speech. See generally
Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other "Abridgements" of Scientific Research:
The ProperScope ofJudicial Review Under the FirstAmendment, 54 EMoRv L.J. 979, 1013-16

(2005) (describing the Court's inconsistent treatment of incidental restrictions on
speech).

In some cases, however, the Court confusingly uses the test designed in

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), to scrutinize one form of incidental restriction-general laws alleged to indirectly restrict symbolic conduct-to review direct time, place, or manner regulations of speech. Such cases, and indeed all of the
foregoing types of cases, will occasionally be discussed where they are relevant to the
issues being examined. Additionally, with some exceptions where they might have
been applicable to a certain discussion of issues, I did not include in my main analysis
cases where the Court might discuss content considerations but involve situations
where the government is generally given less latitude to restrict speech-i.e., decisions
based on the prior restraint, overbreadth, or vagueness doctrines. See, e.g., VOLOK,H,
supra, at 502-41.

6 Most commentators that have analyzed the content distinction tend to include
all of the foregoing types of cases in their analyses, thus running the risk that the
results in those cases are really being driven by factors other than content considerations. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 3, at 125-26; Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions,

supra note 3, at 66-67.
7 See infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text (describing how out of twenty
cases decided by the Court since it commenced applying strict scrutiny to content-

based regulations in 1980, all have been invalidated).
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termination that such a regulation was content-neutral and applied a
standard version of intermediate scrutiny to it, only two have been
8
invalidated.
Second, a review of the Court's post-Renton cases indicate that
that decision was anything but an aberration in calling a facially content discriminatory regulation content-neutral. Indeed, it will be
demonstrated that the vast majority of speech regulationsreviewed by the
Court make content distinctions on their face, and that the Court has
taken quite often to designating them as content-neutral without resort to any sort of secondary effects rationale. 9 The impact of this
development as viewed within the context of the bicategorical content
approach is significant: it means that many selective content restrictions are being scrutinized under more lenient standards of contentneutral review.
Finally, this Article will argue that an obsessive focus on content
regulation-and particularly via an approach that indiscriminately
strikes down regulations that make any sort of content distinction and
generally upholds ones that do not-is not the best way to protect and
promote a healthy and vibrant system of free expression. On the one
hand, it unreasonably ties the government's hands in regulating certain forms of content that give rise to special problems-such as regulations that might impose minor burdens on commercial distributors
of pornographic or exceptionally violent materials to assist parents in
controlling their children's exposure to them-where those regulations present little risk of illegitimate government motivation or censorship (frequently because of the limited nature of the burden
imposed).1 0 On the other hand, it fails to adequately address the risk
8 See infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text (describing how out of fourteen
cases decided by the Court since it commenced applying a formal intermediate standard of scrutiny to time, place, or manner regulations of speech, only two have been
invalidated).
9 See infra note 145 and accompanying text (describing how since and including
its 1986 decision in Renton, the Court has reviewed at least twenty-one cases involving
direct speech regulations of a facially discriminatory nature, and only four that have
been content-neutral on their face); see also infra text accompanying notes 105, 110,
127-32, 135-41, 143 (describing cases where approximately fifty-seven percent of
such facially discriminatory regulations were determined to be content-based (twelve
of the twenty-one cases), and how approximately forty-three percent were determined
or assumed to be content-neutral (nine of the twenty-one cases)).
10 In a moment of unusual candor, Justice O'Connor seemed to acknowledge this
problem with current doctrine, asserting that "it is quite true that regulations are
occasionally struck down because of their content-based nature, even though common sense may suggest that they are entirely reasonable." City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512
U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to free expression posed by content-neutral regulations that might impose significant burdens on how, when, or where expressive activities
are engaged in.
Moreover, this rigid bicategorical content approach has forced
the Court to develop both explicit and covert coping mechanisms
which enable it to review certain regulations outside of that analytical
framework when it perceives that a given content regulation poses little threat to free expression, or that a content-neutral one might require more demanding scrutiny than would otherwise be called for.
However, such coping mechanisms exact a significant cost in terms of
their ad hoc and uncertain application. Lastly, the vagaries inherent
in characterizing speech regulations as content-based versus contentneutral have resulted in standards for distinguishing between them
that are applied in an inconsistent and results-driven manner by the
Court.
Part I of this Article traces the creation and evolution of the content distinction in the Court's free speech jurisprudence, including
the emergence of the bicategorical content approach and the trend
towards designating selective content regulations as content-neutral.
Part II analyzes the problems with these developments, including the
incompatibility of the bicategorical content approach with basic First
Amendment theory, and its inordinate focus on concerns about illegitimate government control of expression. It also describes how the
Court has developed coping mechanisms to avoid applying this doctrinal framework in cases that especially highlight these problems with it.
Additionally, Part II examines the Court's standards for distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral regulations,
demonstrating how it has developed two distinct approaches to regulations that draw content distinctions on their face and those that do
not-even though one might expect a unitary standard for determining the content characterization of a given speech regulation. Within
those approaches, moreover,I will discuss how the standards that have

been developed are applied in a strikingly inconsistent and unprincipled manner. 1 Ironically, this increases the risk of ad hoc and result11 In short, contrary to most commentators who describe the Court's approach to
determining the content status of a given speech regulation as a "government purpose" or "intent" test, I will describe how the Court in fact arbitrarily picks and
chooses between that standard and a "facial discrimination" test (or a combination
thereof) in assessing the content neutrality of regulations that make content distinctions on their face. As to regulations that are content-neutral on their face (a prototypical time, place, or manner regulation), the Court purports to apply a government
purpose standard but in reality usually uses a facial discrimination test. Moreover, I
will discuss how the use of such different standards can result in dramatically different
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oriented decisionmaking, paradoxically creating the opposite effect of
that which many commentators have urged is desirable about a purportedly simple and structured "two-tiered" approach to deciding free
speech cases.
Part III attempts to address the lament of Justice O'Connor that
despite the deficiencies of the content approach the Court should
continue to adhere to it because "no better alternative has yet come to
light.' 12 The "better alternative" I propose does not call for a total
abandonment of content-related assessments in free speech analysis,
but rather that they are considered in context with other important
factors and refined to more sensibly account for the threat to free
expression that a given content regulation might present. Specifically,
it is argued that in evaluating speech regulations a system of "true"
categorical balancing does make the most sense (i.e., one not applied
woodenly or mechanically to rationalize preordained results), where
those categories represent different burdens of persuasion the government must meet to justify a given restriction depending on the threat
to free expression it appears to present (similar in general structure to
current doctrine).
However, under my proposed approach that threat is evaluated
not only by reference to a more careful assessment of the content
character of the regulation, 13 but just as importantly by the burden
the regulation itself appears to impose on a person's right of expressive freedom: both the degree of that burden and its breadth or scope
of operation. The more severe the burden and risk of improper motivation indicated by the foregoing assessments, the heavier the government's own burden becomes in justifying a regulation; conversely, the
lower such burdens and risks appear to be, the less substantial the
government's burden of persuasion becomes. 14 Such an initial assesscontent characterizations of a regulation-and thus dramatically different results regarding similar regulations. See infra Parts LE, II.B.
12 Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 60 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13 For instance, the content appraisal should also take into specific account the
nature of the content classification (e.g., whether it is of a viewpoint or general subject matter nature), what the burden on expressive rights imposed by the regulation
at issue indicates about improper motivation, and whether there are any circumstances or evidence associated with the regulation which indicate a heightened risk of

improper government motivation. See infra Part II.B. These first two considerations
are completely disregarded by existing doctrine, while the latter one is only taken into
account when the Court applies a "government purpose" test of content neutrality
and ignored when it applies a "facial discrimination" test (as it often does). See infra
Part II.B.
14 1 generally propose four different "standards of review" or governmental burdens of persuasion that might be applied depending on whether the initial appraisal
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ment of the effects or burden placed on free speech rights by a given
regulation would seem to be a natural inquiry, but surprisingly current doctrine largely fails to take such considerations into account.
This lack of a threshold burden inquiry is especially striking in light of
the fact that free speech's sister doctrine-the freedom of expressive
association-predominately turns on one. 15 Moreover, additional
support for such an inquiry can be drawn from recent free speech
opinions of Justice Breyer, as well as from the free expression systems
of other liberal democracies committed to ensuring those freedoms.
Finally, I apply the proposed approach to the facts of three important cases in the development of the existing content approach, to
demonstrate how it would produce a more sensible method of analyzing free speech cases than current doctrine produces. It is hoped that
such a new approach, including additional doctrinal reforms proposed in Part 111,16 would go a long way towards rectifying major
problems with the current content approach to free speech analysis.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTENT APPROACH TO FREE
SPEECH ANALYSIS

A.

Mosley, Content Neutrality, and Unanswered Questions

During the first half-century of the First Amendment's existence
prior to the Court's 1972 decision in Mosley, 17 at least two important
principles had started to emerge from the free speech cases decided
of improper motivation and burden on expressive freedoms evaluates those threats as
high, moderate, or low. See infra text accompanying notes 284-89. But I am not
saying that my specific standards are the only possible variations, just that some form
of them would go a long way towards curing the gerrymandering the Court currently
engages in with the content approach to reach otherwise sensible results in many
cases. See infra Part II.B.
15 See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029, 2035 (2005) ("Regulations that
impose severe burdens on associational rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. However, when regulations impose lesser burdens, 'a State's important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.'" (emphases added) (citations omitted)).
16 For instance, Part III also urges that the current amorphous and pliable inquiry into the content character of a given regulation be replaced by a simple facial
discrimination test, in addition to the more discriminating inquiry into the risk of
improper motivation that I propose. See infra text accompanying notes 281-83.
17 Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Prior to a series of decisions stemming from the government's suppression of certain speech during World War I, the
free speech protections of the First Amendment went largely unenforced. See, e.g.,
David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 520
(1981) (observing that prior to such cases, the "Supreme Court, with one minor exception, uniformly found against ... free speech claimants").
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during that era. The first applied when the government was generally
regulating speech, whether in private locations or on public property,
and the second developed mainly in response to regulations of expressive activities in "traditional public forums"-i.e., public property
where expressive and communicative activities have traditionally taken
place, such as public squares, parks, streets, and sidewalks. The first
principle was that laws or other government action that discriminated
against speakers on the basis of the particular views, beliefs, or opinions they expressed-referred to modernly as "viewpoint discrimina18
tion"-were generally inconsistent with the First Amendment.
The second was that regulations which applied to all speakers desiring to engage in certain expressive activities on public property regardless of the content of their speech-i.e., those solely addressing
the time, place, manner, or other circumstance of such activitieswere normally viewed as being less problematic. The Court generally
evaluated such regulations under a balancing approach where it
weighed the free speech interests involved against the competing government interests. 19 In between these two extremes, however, such as
where a law regulated the time, place, or manner of engaging in cer20
tain subject matter areas of speech, the law was largely undefined.
The status of this latter type of law was clarified starkly in Mosley
where the Court reviewed a municipal ordinance that barred picketing close to schools that were in session-thus evincing a concern
about people engaging in a particular manner of speech at a certain
time and place-that made a subject matter distinction by exempting

18

See, e.g.,
Paul B. Stephan III, The FirstAmendment and Content Discrimination,68

VA. L. REV. 203, 215-23 (1982); id. at 203 (asserting that the "principle that the Con-

stitution forbids government discrimination against the expression of particular
messages or ideas . . .merged in the cases soon after the modern Court had begun
taking the first amendment seriously"); id. at 214 (observing that "[f]rom the inception of modern first amendmentjurisprudence through the early years of the Warren
Court, the Court struck down statutes and ordinances only if they discriminated
against proponents of one side of a particular public issue").
19 See, e.g., Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions, supra note 3, at 81. This is not to say
that the Court performed this balancing pursuant to any formalized set of principles
or doctrine. See Stephan, supra note 18, at 207 (quoting Professor Thomas Emerson's

observation in 1970 that "'the outstanding fact about the First Amendment today is
that the Supreme Court has never developed any comprehensive theory of what that
constitutional guarantee means and how it should be applied in concrete cases'"
(quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 15 (1970))).
20 See Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions, supra note 3, at 84 n.10 (observing that in
most early cases involving subject-matter restrictions the Court decided them on
grounds different from that issue).
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"peaceful labor picketing" from its reach. 2 1 As applied in that case,
the ordinance was particularly troubling because it prevented a lone,
peaceful picketer from protesting alleged racial discrimination at an
area school. 2 2 Striking it down as a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause as applied to the rights of free speech because it discriminated
between labor and nonlabor picketing of a peaceful nature, 23 the
Court boldly proclaimed that "above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. ' 24 Such a seemingly absolute rule of content neutrality-requiring neutrality not
only with respect to viewpoints, but as to subject matter categories as
well-was necessary, according to the Court, to protect the right of
people to be free from government censorship of thoughts, as well as
25
the nation's commitment to a free marketplace of public debate. It
followed, then, that the "government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it
may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public
26
facilities."
Both the facts and reasoning of Mosley suggested there were two
important principles animating the robust new standard of content
neutrality the Court announced: first, the government had no business granting or denying speakers access to a public forum on the
grounds of the ideas or views they wished to express, and, second,
such content regulation presented a substantial risk of "invidious discrimination" against certain viewpoints or beliefs. 27 But regardless of
21 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-95. Mosley was decided in conjunction with the companion case of Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), in which the Court struck
down a city ordinance identical to the one at issue in Mosley for the reasons given in
the latter case, see id. at 107; Mosley, 408 -U.S. at 94-102. However, in Grayned the
Court sustained the conviction of a person who had demonstrated near a school
under an antinoise ordinance that was not at issue in Mosley. Grayned, 408 U.S. at
107-21.
22 As the Court framed the facts, up until the ordinance was enacted "Mosley
would walk the public sidewalk adjoining the school, carrying a sign that read: 'Jones
High School practices black discrimination. Jones High School has a black quota.'
His lonely crusade was always peaceful, orderly, and quiet, and was conceded to be so
by the city of Chicago." Mosley, 408 U.S. at 93.
23 Id. at 94-102.
24 Id. at 95.
25 Id. at 95-96.
26 Id. at 96.
27 This latter explanation is supported by much language in Mosley discussing the
danger of illegitimately motivated speech restrictions, as typified by the Court's quotation of Justice Black from an earlier case:
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the specific reasons for it, the promulgation of such a seemingly broad
and unqualified rule to address these concerns appeared to create as
many problems as it was designed to solve. To begin with, beyond
certain content-based categories of speech that the Court had previously declared to merit qualified or no First Amendment protection
because of their low value or inherently harmful potential-such as
obscenity, libel, or incitement-did this mean that the government
lacked any power to regulate speech of a certain content regardless of
the circumstances surrounding its expression? 28 At best, such an approach seemed unrealistic and unworkable, and at worst it seemed
potentially harmful if the government was powerless to address
problems associated with certain speech that did not fall into an official "unprotected" category. 29 Moreover, what exactly did it mean for
the government to restrict expression "because of' or "based on" its
content, and how was this to be determined? In ordinary parlance,
this implied that if a governmental concern about the content or substance of the restricted expression caused or was the primary reason
for the restriction, then the regulation was per se invalid. This in turn
"[T]o deny this appellant and his group use of the streets because of their
views against racial discrimination, while allowing other groups to use the
streets to voice opinions on other subjects, also amounts, I think, to an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 98 (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring)).
28 That this was the import of Mosley was explicitly acknowledged by a plurality of
the Court in a later case when it stated that if Mosley was "read literally and without
regard for the facts . . . [it] would absolutely preclude any regulation of expressive
activity predicated in whole or in part on the content of the communication." See
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 65 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also infra
text accompanying notes 40-46. However, at least one statement in Mosley suggested
that its principle of content neutrality might not be as strict as it seemed where the
Court concluded a key passage by asserting that "[s] elective exclusions from a public
forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to
content alone." Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96. Standing by itself, this statement could be
read to suggest that content regulation might be permissible as long as the government also sought to regulate noncontent factors. But other statements made by the
Court suggested that the government could only aim at the noncontent effects of
speech which might motivate a regulation versus restricting its content as such. See,
e.g., id. at 101-02 (asserting that picketing problems the government claimed to be
aiming at could be "controlled by narrowly drawn statutes focusing on the abuses and
dealing evenhandedly with picketing regardless of subject matter"); see also id. at 95
(asserting that "[t]he central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes
permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter"). Mosley, however, was hardly a
model of clarity and thus it is impossible to discern exactly what the Court meant with
respect to the scope of its content neutrality principle.
29 For an example of such problems, see infra text accompanying notes 160-76.
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suggested that one must examine the government's reasons orjustifications for a content restriction unless they were apparent from the
face of the regulation-a rare event unless the government explained
the purpose for a regulation in the measure itself.
Mosley, however, suggested that the mere differential treatment of
content on the face of a regulation was sufficient to violate its mandate of content neutrality. As the Court stated: "In this case, the ordinance itself describes impermissible picketing not in terms of time,
place, and manner, but in terms of subject matter. The regulation
thus slips from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a
concern about content. This is never permitted." 30 This statement
was puzzling at several levels. First, it was an erroneous description of
the regulation at issue. It was not described either in terms of subject
matter or "time, place, and manner," as the Court stated. It clearly was
both-a restriction on nonlabor picketing at a certain place and time.
Thus, the Court created a false dichotomy between content restrictions and speech regulations based on time, place, and manner that
still persists today.3 1
More importantly, it seems clear that many speech regulations
might single out certain content for differential treatment for reasons
having nothing to do with a governmental concern about their substance or message. In Mosley itself, for example, suppose the collective
bargaining agreements of the schools covered by the ordinance obligated them to allow peaceful picketing during times of labor disputes.
In such a case, the differential treatment of labor picketing would be
explained by the schools' legal obligations, rather than any particular
concern for views associated with nonlabor picketing or preference
for those associated with labor picketing.3 2 And to compound this
problem, after asserting that facial discrimination between types of
content was never permitted, the Court nonetheless proceeded to analyze and reject the government's justifications for the differential
treatment of labor picketing 33-suggesting that a facially discriminatory regulation might be saved by a content-neutral justification for it.

30

Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99.

See infra Part I.D. for a further discussion of this problem.
32 Indeed, in Mosely itself one argument the government made was that the labor
exemption was required under its view of the scope of federal labor law, an argument
the Court rejected as presenting too attenuated of an interest. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 102
n.9; see also infra note 235 (discussing further the concerns motivating the labor exemption in the Mosley ordinance).
31

33

Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100-02.
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Perhaps because of these problems with the Mosley analysis, only six
Justices unqualifiedly joined

it.

34

Early on, then, Mosley set the stage for at least two difficult
problems with the broad principle of content neutrality that it announced. The first was the seemingly unrealistic notion that aside
from certain narrow categories of unprotected speech, the government could never regulate speech on the basis of its content no matter how limited or reasonable the regulatory goal might be that it was
attempting to achieve. In other words, even narrowly drawn time,
place, manner, or circumstance regulations that made the slightest
content distinction would be invalid. It seemed doubtful that such a
rule would work or be desirable in actual application. The second
and related problem was how one determined whether a regulation
was content-based, and thus subject to such stringent treatment. The
following subparts of Part I will describe how the Court responded to
these problems and the way in which it continues to struggle with
them even today.
B.

The Court's Response to the Unresolved Mosley Problems-Absolute
Content Neutrality or Hyperbole?

Mosley's principle of absolute content neutrality did take some
root in the Court's free speech jurisprudence for a decade or so after
that decision, even though those roots were fairly shallow and the
principle not consistently adhered to. Three terms after Mosley, in
Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville,3 5 the Court struck down an ordinance
that barred drive-in theatres from exhibiting scenes containing nudity
that could be seen by people outside the theatre.3 6 Writing for the
Court and relying principally on Mosley, Justice Powell explained that
the government's powers were "strictly limit[ed]" when it selectively
restricted content on the grounds of its potential offensiveness to
others. 37 Significantly, however, the Court relied on earlier precedent
to observe that selective restrictions on offensive content might be
permissible in two different situations: when the speech invaded substantial privacy interests or was directed at a captive audience. 38 More34 Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist merely concurred in the result without explaining why. Id. at 102 (Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the result).
Chief Justice Burger technically concurred in the Court's opinion but expressed reservations about the principle that the government was never allowed to regulate content. Id. at 102-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
35 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
36 Id. at 206-18.
37 Id. at 209.
38 Id. at 209-12.
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over, the Court suggested that governmental interests in protecting
children from harmful materials or ensuring traffic safety might warrant selective restrictions that were sufficiently tailored to achieving
these goals. 39 Thus, the Court's commitment to an absolute content
neutrality principle was, in theory at least, already being qualified by
certain seemingly ad hoc and ill-defined exceptions.
In two more cases dealing with the regulation of purportedly offensive content that the Court decided within three years of Erznoznik,
some of those exceptions took on real significance. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,40 the Court upheld zoning restrictions that
were applicable solely to movie theatres exhibiting "adult" films, 41 and
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation4 2 it upheld a penalty leveled by the gov-

ernment on a radio station for broadcasting "indecent" content during hours when children were likely to be in the audience. 43 In both
cases, a plurality of the Court led by Justice Stevens essentially asserted
that Mosley had overstated the content neutrality principle, and maintained that its primary application was in the prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination by the government rather than the selective treatment
of given topics or subject matter areas of speech-and especially when
content of a low value such as pornography or profane and indecent
language was at issue. 44 However, concurring separately and supplying the deciding vote in both cases, Justice Powell was unwilling to
limit Mosley in such ways. Instead, in Young he voted to uphold the
restrictions on adult theatres on the grounds that the government's
purpose was not to restrict such movies, but rather to address the "secondary effects" of such theatres such as increased crime and lower
property values. 45 In Pacifica,his vote to uphold restrictions on indecent radio broadcasts was based on the pervasive nature of that medium of communication and the government's interest in protecting
46
children.
Although Mosley's content neutrality principle barely survived
Young and Pacifica with the help of Justice Powell's exceptions to it,
7
three years later it reemerged in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.4
There, a plurality of the Court struck down an outdoor advertising
39
40

Id. at 212-15.
427 U.S. 50 (1976).

41
42

Id. at 52-84.
438 U.S. 726 (1978).

43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 729-62.
Id. at 744-51; Young, 427 U.S. at 63-73.
Young, 427 U.S. at 73-84 (Powell, J., concurring).
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 755-62 (Powell, J., concurring).
453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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ordinance that severely restricted the use of billboards for outdoor
advertising because it made exceptions for the advertising of businesses at their own locations and certain types of commercial and
noncommercial advertising. 48 While the plurality's main concern was
with the ordinance's preference for commercial over noncommercial
speech, it also faulted the selective nature of the ban on noncommercial ads. Citing to Mosley and its progeny, the plurality tersely explained that "the city may not choose the appropriate subjects for
public discourse" because to do so would allow the government "control over the search for political truth." 49 And another three years
later, in Regan v. Time, Inc.,50 the Court again invoked a rule of strict
content neutrality to strike down a law that barred reproducing
images of U.S. currency because it made an exception for certain publications if they were made for educational, news reporting, or other
51
specified purposes.
Surprisingly, however, after the Time case and some twelve years
after Mosley had introduced the principle of absolute content neutrality, it disappeared from the Court's opinions as a rule of decision as
quickly as it had appeared. Although the Court has continued to invoke the notion of absolute neutrality even today as part of its rhetorical flourishes, 52 several years before Time it started taking a different
analytical approach to content-based regulations which gradually became the dominant one used today. Nonetheless, as I will discuss in
the next subpart, Mosley's principle of absolute neutrality has continued to exert a heavy influence on the Court's attitude towards the
constitutionality of such regulations.
48 Id. at 493-521 (plurality opinion). Justices Brennan and Blackmun concurred
in the judgment on the grounds that the regulation effectively constituted a complete
ban on the use of billboards and that the plurality's opinion relied too heavily on
distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech. Id. at 521-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
49 Id. at 515 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ironically,
one of Mosley's progeny that the plurality cited was Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980), a decision which at least in theory initiated a significant doctrinal shift by the
Court towards a less absolutist approach to content regulation. See infra notes 53-57
and accompanying text.
50 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
51 Id. at 648-49 (asserting that "[r]egulations which permit the Government to
discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the
First Amendment."). The Court nonetheless upheld restrictions on the color and size
of U.S. currency image reproductions as content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. See id. at 655-60.
52

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).
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Strict Scrutiny Review and De Facto Content Neutrality

In Carey v. Brown,53 decided between Pacifica and Metromedia, the
Court revisited the issue of the constitutionality of an ordinance that
was very similar to the one reviewed in Mosley. There, the Court scrutinized an ordinance that, put simply, banned all picketing of residences except for peaceful labor picketing. 54 Although relying almost
exclusively on Mosley to strike the ordinance down, the Court conspicuously omitted the "government has no power to restrict content" assertion from the center of a lengthy Mosley quote where it would have
otherwise been natural to include it. 55 Instead, the Court made the
surprising but noncommittal assertion that "though we might agree
that certain state interests may be so compelling that where no adequate alternatives exist a content-based distinction-if narrowly
drawn-would be a permissible way of furthering those objectives, this
is not such a case." 56 With this one ambivalent statement, however,
the Court began a significant doctrinal shift towards the notion that
content-based regulations of speech could be constitutional as long as
the government could demonstrate a sufficiently compelling interest
for the restriction and that it was narrowly tailored to serve that
57
interest.
53 447 U.S. 455.
54 Id. at 457-59.
55 See id. at 463.
56 Id. at 465 (citation omitted).
57 One might argue that the Court actually began this shift two years earlier in its
decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), where the
Court invoked a compelling interest test in striking down a content-based restriction
on corporate speech. See id. at 786-95. However, in that case Justice Powell, writing
for the Court, engaged in a somewhat peculiar analysis. First, he invoked Mosley's
absolutist approach to declare that "[i]n the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons
may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue." Id. at 784-85. But
instead of relying on this principle to invalidate the selective speech restriction at
issue, he then proceeded to subject it to a compelling interest test not on account of
content discrimination, but rather under an older line of cases holding that infringements on rights of political speech and association merited such exacting scrutiny.
See id. at 786. Thus, at this point the principle of content discrimination had not yet
been directly connected to a less absolutist compelling interest mode of analysis. Justice Powell essentially took the same puzzling approach on behalf of the Court to a
content-based speech restriction in a case decided on the same day as Carey. See Consol. Edison v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-44 (1980). There, however, he
couched the principle requiring the application of a compelling interest analysis not
as one involving an infringement of political speech, but rather stated that any restrictions on "the speech of a private person" warranted such an approach (even though
all of the cases he relied on involved political speech or association). See id. at 540.
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This shift became pronounced when, two terms later, the Court
decided Widmar v. Vincent.5 8 There, it overturned a state university
policy designed to ensure compliance with the Establishment Clause
by excluding religious groups from the use of facilities which were
generally made available for various student activities. 59 Observing
that this was an exclusion from a public forum based on the religious
content of speech, the Court asserted, citing to Carey, that the university involved "must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate
to content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn
to achieve that end."60 To imply that this test was an established standard of review for content-based restrictions was quite an overstatement in light of Carey's treatment of this issue and the more
established line of cases recognizing Mosley's absolutist approach.
Nonetheless, with this assertion the Court initiated, at least formally, the modern approach of subjecting selective content restrictions to a strict form of balancing rather than simply declaring them
to be per se invalid. Moreover, although the seminal cases of Mosley,
Carey, and Widmarhad all technically dealt with the selective exclusion
of certain speakers from public forums based on the content of their
speech, a few years later the Court, without any discussion of what it
was doing, extended the application of the strict scrutiny mode of
analysis. to its evaluations of the constitutionality of content restric61
tions on general private speech.
The Court's choice of the strict scrutiny analysis over the absolute
neutrality standard implied that content restrictions at least theoretiSuffice it to say thatJustice Powell's unusual approach to content-based restrictionsstating that they were impermissible under Mosley and simultaneously conducting
analyses suggesting that a compelling interest could sustain them under older doctrine that did not directly address the problem of content discrimination-seemed
anomalous in the context of the Court's general approach to content-based restrictions as described in the text.
58 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
59 Id. at 264-77.
60 Id. at 270 (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 461, 464-65). Ironically, the author of the
Court's opinion in Widmarwasjustice Powell, who had previously taken the somewhat
unusual approach to content-based restrictions discussed at supra note 57.
61 See Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987). One could
argue that this extension was initiated a year earlier injustice Powell's opinion for a
plurality of the Court in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1986) (plurality opinion) (asserting in a case involving a First Amendment right of access to a utility's billing envelope that the government may not im-

pose a "content-based grant of access to private property .. .absent a compelling
interest").
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cally could be used by the government to address regulatory problems
tied to certain types of expression, provided it demonstrated a sufficiently compelling or persuasive need and a strong sensitivity to free
speech interests in addressing it. 62 In practice, however, the Court

appears to have retained Mosley's absolute neutrality approach dressed
up as a stringent balancing analysis. In the twenty cases commencing
with Carey where a majority of the Court has applied a strict scrutiny
standard for reasons of content discrimination,it has found every one to be
unconstitutional. 63 Thus the Court has struck down content-based restrictions imposed upon commercial providers of sexually explicit
62 See, e.g., Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (asserting that "[ t ] he Government may... regulate the content of constitutionally protected
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive
means to further the articulated interest").
63 See infra text accompanying notes 64-74. Although the application of strict
scrutiny to a speech regulation normally sounds its death knell, in one case dealing
with a restriction on corporate expenditures related to political campaigns, the Court
upheld the law under that standard. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652 (1990). However, the Court was not applying strict scrutiny on content regulation grounds as such, but rather pursuant to a standard used by the Court in the
seminal campaign finance case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), that called for
.exacting scrutiny" when a speech regulation is alleged to restrict core political
speech. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 657 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45). Although Buckley did not cite a case in direct support of that standard, it appears to have been drawn
from the same line of cases Justice Powell drew on in Bellotti, discussed at supra note
57. Even though restrictions on expenditures and contributions related to political
campaigns appear on their face to be content-based in the sense that they selectively
burden certain political expression, following Buckley's lead the Court typically has
not analyzed such restrictions as presenting content discrimination problems.
Rather, the Court generally applies strict scrutiny to restrictions on political expenditures under the Buckley principle discussed above, and applies a more relaxed form of
scrutiny to restrictions on political contributions primarily on the theory that they do
not burden rights of political expression as seriously as expenditure restrictions do.
See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134-42 (2003) (political contributions); Austin, 494 U.S. at 657 (political expenditures). In McConnel the Court recently upheld
restrictions on corporate and union campaign-related expenditures analogous to
those upheld in Austin, but the Court was applying overbreadth analysis (due to the
facial nature of the challenge to the statute there) rather than a standard strict scrutiny analysis. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 202-09.
The closest a majority of the Court has come to upholding a regulation under
strict scrutiny that was applied for reasons of the law's content-based nature is where a
plurality of fourJustices voted to uphold a restriction on political campaigning in the
vicinity of voting stations. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193-211 (1992) (plurality opinion). The fifth vote to uphold the law, however, was provided pursuant to
public forum doctrine that did not call for such exacting review. Id. at 214-16
(Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, a majority of the Court has never sustained a regulation that was strictly scrutinized for content discrimination reasons.
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materials to protect minors, 64 candidates for judgeships to safeguard
the impartiality of the judiciary, 65 the use of government property and
funds for religious speech stemming from Establishment Clause concerns, 66 the use of "hate speech" symbols for racial, religious, or gender reasons, 67 parade permits through fees designed to recoup a
portion of policing expenses, 68 the compensation of criminals for writing books describing their crimes, 6 9 those burning flags as a means of
political protest 70 or demonstrating against foreign government embassies, 7 1 select types of magazines through sales tax exemptions provided to other magazines, 72 and the picketing of residences. 73 It has
also invalidated laws requiring the disclosure of particular informa64 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Sable Commc'ns, 492 U.S. 115.
65 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
66 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Good News,
Rosenberger, Lamb's Chapel, and Widmar actually involved the question of the propriety
of excluding religious groups from limited public fora because of the religious nature
of their expression, a problem that is typically analyzed under a more relaxed form of
scrutiny than traditional strict scrutiny-to wit, that the access decisions be viewpoint
neutral and reasonably consistent with the purpose for which the forum was created.
However, in each of these cases except for Widmar, the Court evaluated the restriction
at issue under a compelling interest analysis because it was determined to constitute
viewpoint discrimination (in Widmar, the access restriction was subjected to a standard strict scrutiny analysis on basic content discrimination grounds). Thus, the
Court essentially applied strict scrutiny to all of these restrictions because they constituted content discrimination, and I have accordingly treated these cases as such.
67 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). PHA.V. involved "fighting
words," speech that would normally lack First Amendment protection, but the Court
held that because the government had selectively regulated such speech the content
discrimination principle brought it within the sphere of constitutional protection.
68 Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). In this case, the
Court also invalidated the permit regulation at issue on the grounds that it constituted an invalid prior restraint because government officials had too much discretion
to grant or withhold permits. See id. at 130-33. But it was clear that the Court would
have invalidated the ordinance on content discrimination grounds alone even if the
prior restraint problem had not been present. See id. at 133-37.
69 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991).
70 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
71 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
72 Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
73 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
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tion, or the dissemination of another party's writings, as content-based
compulsions of speech. 4
This one hundred percent invalidation rate is particularly striking
in view of the fact that, as I will discuss in more detail later, many of
the laws that were struck down seemed to present little risk of the
concern that principally motivated content-based analysis in the first
place-that government would censor speech or manipulate the marketplace of ideas on the basis of its approval or disapproval of the
substance of the communications. 75 Nonetheless, the Court itself has
not been shy about asserting that even though content-based analysis
may be couched in terms of stringent balancing, that standard of review in fact approaches a requirement of absolute content neutrality. 76 Hence, it appears that although Mosley's absolute neutrality
approach was formally discarded by the Court as a doctrinal principle,
substantively it continues to significantly influence its treatment of
content-based restrictions. The implications for this uncompromising
approach to such regulations will be examined below.
D.

Content-Neutral Speech Regulations

On the flip side of the content coin, if a person was a fan of symmetrical principles and hoped for a similarly wooden approach to
speech regulations characterized as content-neutral, she would not be
disappointed. The term "content-neutral" is often used as a synonym
for "time, place, and manner" regulations, but this is misleading.
Content-based restrictions often regulate the time, place, or manner
of speech as well, it is just that they frequently limit the operation of
such a regulation to speech of a certain content (as in Mosley). In this
74 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n
of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
75 See infra text accompanying notes 142, 165-76, 222-23. As I will discuss in
more detail later, this seemed particularly true of the restrictions that seemed to impose a relatively minor burden on expressive freedoms-such as those requiring
commercial sex websites to utilize age verification controls, or involved speech where
government officials were not likely to have a particular ideological stance regarding
it-such as the restrictions prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their
views on controversial topics regardless of the position they were espousing.
76 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)
(asserting "[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will
ever be permissible"); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (declaring
that "[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid"); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 135 (1992) (asserting "[t]his Court has held time
and again: 'Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of
the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment"').
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sense, content-based time, place, or manner regulations commonly restrict a much narrower range of speech than content-neutral ones.
Nonetheless, both the "time, place, or manner" and "content-neutral"
labels have essentially become terms of art to express a conclusion by
the Court that a given regulation will be subjected to a fairly deferential level of scrutiny.
Historically, it was only the "time, place, or manner" designation
that was used to signal that a given regulation of speech would often,
though not always, receive favorable treatment by the Court. 77 The

fact that a law aimed to regulate the time, place, or manner of expressive activities did seem to the Court to be a good reason for subjecting
it to more lenient review-not only did expressive activities need to be
ordered like other forms of conduct to avoid the undue infringement
of other peoples' rights, but when such a regulation applied to all
speakers wishing to engage in a particular activity it reduced the risk
that the government was covertly attempting to restrict speech on the
basis of its disapproval of particular speakers or views. Absolute content neutrality, however, was not a formal doctrinal requirement for
such treatment: the key concern in such cases was ensuring that a licensing or permitting regulation did not provide government officials
with discretion to discriminate against disfavored speakers. 78 It was
not until Mosley declared that all speech regulations had to meet a
broad standard of content neutrality that such a requirement was almost offhandedly, in the dictum of a case, made a formal requirement
of time, place, or manner review. 79 And it was not until Carey shifted
77 Compare, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding ban on excessive noise using sound amplification devices in certain public areas), and Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding requirement that a special license be
required to hold a parade or procession on a public street), with Schneider v. New
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down general prohibitions on hand billing in
certain public places as unduly burdening speech in light of purpose to keep streets

clean).
78 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding a statute that
required a license to engage in certain religious or charitable solicitations unconstitutional as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses on grounds that it vested undue discretion in
local officials). However, the Cantwell Court also observed that the "State is ...free to
regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety,

peace, comfort or convenience." Id. at 306-07. In essence, the Court was saying that
certain subjects of speech-here, speech involving the solicitation of money-could
be subject to time, place, or manner regulations, indicating that such regulations did
not need to be strictly content-neutral at least as to broad subject matter categories of
speech.
79 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976). Given its announcement of a broad content neutrality principle in
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972), it was not surprising that the Court intimated both
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ground and suggested that some speech regulations might not have to
be content-neutral-i.e., some content-based restrictions might be
sustainable under a strict standard of review-that the Court had the
occasion or need for emphasizing that such neutrality was an essential
requirement for a regulation to be assessed under the more relaxed
level of traditional time, place or manner of review.
80
This it did in ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. Public Service Commission,
which was decided on the same day as Carey. In declining to apply
time, place, or manner review to a state commission order that barred
a utility company from discussing certain topics in its bill inserts, the
Court explained that "the essence of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition that various methods of speech, regardless
of their content, may frustrate legitimate government goals. '8 1 But because regulations based on content (including the Commission's order in that case) must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that
speech is not "prohibited merely because public officials disapprove
the speaker's views . . .a constitutionally permissible time, place, or

manner restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech. '8 2 With Carey introducing the strict scrutiny
standard of review for content-based restrictions, and Consolidated
Edison simultaneously and clearly mandating content-neutrality for
the more deferential time, place, or manner review, these cases appeared to mark the true birth of the bifurcated content approach in
its present form involving two different standards of review the Court
applies based on the content characterization of a regulation.
This modern version of the time, place, or manner standard of
review was first actually applied by the Court in Heffton v. International
Society for Krishna Consciousness,8 3 where the Court upheld a state law
requiring that anyone soliciting funds or distributing literature at a
state fair do so only from booths.8 4 Noting that such a place and manner restriction would be upheld if it was "'justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech . . .serve [d] a significant gov-

ernmental interest, and... le [ft] open ample alternative channels for
in that case, as well as in its companion case of Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
115-17 (1972), and the soon-to-follow decision in Erznoznik, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975),
that some form of content neutrality applied to time, place, or manner review. But it
was not until Virginia State Board that the Court announced a formal standard of time,
place, or manner review, and made content neutrality a clear requirement of it.
80 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
81 Id. at 536.
82

Id.

83
84

452 U.S. 640 (1981).
Id. at 654.
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communication of the information,'"85 the Court found it satisfied in
that case.8 6 Two terms later, however, without explanation the Court
added a fourth requirement to this standard in a case where the discussion of it was mere dicta: that the regulation be "narrowly tailored"
to serve the significant government interest. 87 Despite its almost offhanded addition, this fourth requirement has remained part of the
test's modern formulation even though it later required a conscious
effort by the Court to relax its requirements in order to distinguish it
from an identical requirement found in the strict scrutiny standard
applicable to content-based regulations.88
Although generally referred to as an "intermediate" standard of
scrutiny, in actual operation this standard has been fairly deferential
to government interests. In the fourteen cases commencing with Hef
fron where the Court has determined or assumed that a speech regulation is content-neutral and has reviewed it under this standard or a
close variant, 9 just two of those regulations failed to pass review and
only because they involved broad or total bans on the use of popular
mediums of expression in places where such restrictions on speech
seemed especially inappropriate.9 0 Thus the Court has upheld restric85 Id. at 648 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
86 See id. at 647-56.
87 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). It
is possible that the Court derived this requirement from its discussion of time, place,
or manner regulations in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972), but
that portion of the Grayned opinion was not cited by the court in Perry.
88 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-800 (1989).
89 At times the Court will review content-neutral regulations of speech under the
test announced in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for generally applicable laws that incidentally burden speech. However, the Court has generally treated
these tests as substantially similar even though the time, place, and manner standard
formally inquires about alternative channels of communication while the O'Brien test
does not. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
90 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (ban on display of most signs on
own property); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (complete ban on leafletting and picketing on public sidewalk surrounding U.S. Supreme Court building).
The Court has held unconstitutional speech restrictions it determined to be contentneutral in at least three other cases, but in each of those the Court was not applying a
typical time, place, or manner standard of review (or its O'Briencounterpart). Rather,
it applied standards of scrutiny that appeared to be significantly more strict. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-29 (2001); id. at 544 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting);
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 372-74 (1997) (upholding
some restrictions on abortion clinic protests but invalidating others); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 764-68 (1994) (same); see also infra notes 130,
213-14 and accompanying text (discussing these cases further). While one could argue that these three cases raise the ratio of decision where the Court has invalidated
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tions on the locations of "adult" businesses and means by which erotic
dancers perform,9 1 the methods abortion opponents use to stage pro93
tests, 9 2 the amount of volume used in outside musical performances,
the picketing of particular residences, 94 the use of the word "Olympic"
in certain contexts and reproducing images of U.S. currency, 95 the
use of national parks to stage demonstrations,9 6 the posting of temporary signs on government property, 9 7 and the manner in which a religious group could solicit money from, and distribute materials to,
fairgoers. 98 Under a similar analysis, it has also upheld regulations
compelling cable television operators to carry certain programming. 9 9
Such a low rate of invalidating speech restrictions under contentneutral review is just as striking as the stringent rate of invalidation
associated with content-based review, particularly in light of the fact
speech regulations pursuant to content-neutral review from a lowly two of fourteen
cases to a slightly more meaningful five of seventeen cases, the fact that the Court had
to depart from its standard content-neutral test to make possible the latter results
speaks volumes about the Court's own view of its leniency. Moreover, the stricter
standards of review employed in these cases appeared to be exceptions to the Court's
normal standards of content-centered analysis. See infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text. Lastly, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), the Court
rejected a time, place, and manner defense in the course of invalidating an arguably
content-neutral ban on commercial live entertainment. However, the Court did not
discuss the content issue-where arguably a ban limited to live entertainment of a commercial nature was not content-neutral-and appeared to invalidate the restriction primarily on overbreadth grounds. See id. at 65-77.
91 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); see also City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535
U.S. 425, 440-42 (2002) (plurality opinion) (remanding for application of contentneutral review but holding low burden of proof appropriate for restrictions).
92 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
93 Ward, 491 U.S. 781.
94 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
95 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987); Regan
v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984). In San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., although the
law at issue primarily restricted commercial speech, employing the O'Brien test the
Court also upheld the law against a claim that it was restricting political speech. See
483 U.S. at 535-41. In Time, the Court invalidated part of a currency image reproduction restriction as being content-based, but upheld the part of it directed at the size
and color of reproductions under content-neutral time, place, and manner review.
See 468 U.S. at 655-59.
96 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). Even though
the regulations at issue in Clark were incidental versus direct restrictions on speech,
the Court primarily analyzed them as ctent-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions of speech. See id. at 293-99.
97 Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
98 Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
99 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
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that many of the laws upheld appeared to raise a significant risk that
the government might be preferring or disfavoring certain content or
speakers. 10 0 Nonetheless, it is clear that the characterization of a
speech restriction as being content-neutral dramatically increases it
chances of being upheld, almost to the same degree that a contentbased designation normally ensures its invalidation.10 1
E. DistinguishingContent-Basedfrom Content-NeutralSpeech Regulations:
The Rise of Selective Content Restrictions Regarded
as Content-Neutral
Mosley not only raised unanswered questions about the absoluteness of the content-neutrality principle, but also about how that principle would be defined. In that case, the Court strongly suggested that
a regulation which on its face singled out or differentiated between
types of content would make it impermissibly content-based. 02 This
reading of Mosley was confirmed by the Court in Young, where eight
Justices (the four plurality members and four dissenters) all agreed
that because the zoning ordinance at issue treated adult and nonadult
theatres differently, it was content-based.1 0 3 Only Justice Powell believed it was not, using the government's asserted purpose for the ordinance-to control the effects on the neighborhood of adult
theatres-as his criterion instead of the disparate facial treatment of
the expressive content of films. 10 4 In other words, the reasons for the

content distinction were what mattered to Justice Powell, and if they
did not have to do with an attempt by the government to restrict the
substance of the expression itself, then the ordinance was not impermissibly content-based. The Court, however, generally continued to
utilize a facial discrimination test for determining whether an ordi-

100 This was especially, though not exclusively, true as to the restrictions governing
more controversial areas of expression, such as that of a sexually explicit nature or
that involving abortion protests. See infra notes 195, 209-12, 222-23 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this problem.
101 Thus it appears that commentary which has typically characterized the Court's
content-based review as more of a categorical approach disfavoring government interests, and its content-neutral review as a more evenhanded balancing approach to evaluating free speech versus government interests, has only had it half right.
102 See supra text accompanying note 30.
103 SeeYoung v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52-53, 63 (1976) (plurality
opinion); id. at 84 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 82 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
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nance was content-based for many years until its 1986 decision in City
0 5
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
This situation changed significantly with Renton, but by no means
completely. That case posed an almost identical question to the one
the Court faced in Young-the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance
that, on its face, singled out adult movie theatres for special restrictions on their locations. 10 6 But instead of relying primarily on the
viewpoint neutrality and "low value" speech rationales used by the plurality in Young, a majority of the Renton Court adopted Justice Powell's
concurring position from that case as its principal justification for sustaining the ordinance. Borrowing from a standard the Court had
sometimes expressed in connection with time, place, or manner review but, ironically, never literally followed, the Court held that the
ordinance was not content-based because it was "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech" 1 0 7-namely, the government's predominate purpose of addressing "the secondary effects of
such theatres on the surrounding community."' 0 8 Thus, the Court
held, "at least with respect to businesses that purvey sexually explicit
materials," the content-based or content-neutral character of a speech
regulation would be assessed by reference to the government's
"'predominate' intent" rather than its facially discriminatory scope of
application.10 9
The "at least" qualifier used by the Court suggested that it might
limit Renton's purpose analysis to restrictions on commercial distributors of adult materials, and even then to situations involving what
might be characterized as "secondary effects" associated with such
content. However, two years later in Boos v. Barry,'10 and over the
105 475 U.S. 41 (1986). See e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516-17, 519 (1981); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-63 (1980).
One notable exception to this methodology was Justice Powell's line of opinions for
himself or the Court, where, as I discussed earlier, he utilized a rather idiosyncratic
approach to reviewing content-based restrictions. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Justice Powell's opinions normally focused on the government's asserted
purpose for a discriminatory speech restriction in determining whether or not it was
content-based. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 12-13, 20
(1986) (plurality opinion) (decided the same day as Renton); Consol. Edison Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980); Young, 427 U.S. at 78-82 & n.6 (Powell,
J., concurring).
106 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43-46 (1986).

107
108
109

Id. at 48.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 48-49.

110

485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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vigorous objection of two Justices, a plurality of the Court implicitly
assumed that a Renton purpose analysis might apply to a selective content restriction on political speech.1 1 ' There, the Court reviewed a
District of Columbia law that prohibited the display of a sign within
500 feet of a foreign embassy if it tended to bring the foreign government into "public odium" or "public disrepute."11 2 The asserted purpose of the law was to bring the United States into compliance with a
diplomatic treaty that required host countries to, among other things,
"take all appropriate steps" to "prevent any . . .impairment of [the

foreign government's] dignity." 113 The plurality rejected the argument that the law was content-neutral under Renton because its purpose was to ensure compliance with international law, reasoning that
the government was targeting the primary effects or communicative
impact of the restricted speech-i.e., "listeners' reactions" to it or its
"emotive impact"-instead of any secondary effects that "happen to be
associated" with it.114 The Court thus invalidated the regulation
115
under a strict scrutiny analysis.
The combined effect of Renton and Boos was to open up speech
regulations that made content distinctions on their face to arguments
that they were content-neutral under a government purpose analysis.
Before these decisions, in cases since Mosley where the Court had engaged in a content analysis, it generally found facially discriminatory
regulations to be content-based and facially nondiscriminatory regulations to be content-neutral. 116 In other words, during this period
111 See id. at 320-21 (plurality opinion); id. at 334-38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
112 See id. at 315 (plurality opinion).
113 Id. at 322 (quoting Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961,
23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95) (internal quotations marks omitted).
114 See id. at 320-21; see also id. at 321 (observing that the regulation did not point
to "'secondary effects' . . . [such as] congestion ....

interference with ingress or

egress, to visual clutter, or to the need to protect the security of embassies").
115 See id. at 321-29. To make a majority for striking down the regulation, the two
concurring Justices joined all of the plurality's opinion except for its "assumption that
the Renton analysis applie[d] not only outside the context of businesses purveying
sexually explicit materials but even to political speech." Id. at 334-35 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). At the same time the Court
upheld a restriction on groups congregating close to foreign embassies against an
overbreadth challenge, observing in part that that regulation "merely regulate[d] the

place and manner of certain demonstrations." See id. at 329-32 (plurality opinion).
116 For pre-Renton cases where facially discriminatory speech regulations were
found to be content-based, see Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490

(1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50

2oo61

SPEECH

AND

DISTRUST

1375

facially discriminatory regulations were not considered to be contentneutral. After Renton and Boos, however, this situation changed
17

dramatically. 1

In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,118 decided a year after Boos and
still regarded today as an important case in terms of attempting to
define the difference between content-based and neutral regulations,
the Court through Justice Kennedy explained that " [t] he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and
in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement
with the message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling consideration."' "1 9 Then, citing to Renton-again over the objection of three dissenting Justices who decried the Court's "unnecessary
(1976); Erznoznik v.City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). For pre-Renton
cases where facially nondiscriminatory speech regulations were found to be contentneutral, see Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh, 453
U.S. 114 (1981).

It could be argued, however, that some minor exceptions to these

general patterns did exist. In Heffron, even though the restriction at issue was determined by the Court to be content-neutral because of its facially nondiscriminatory
character, it was in fact not facially neutral because in addition to restricting the sale
and distribution of all literature at a state fair (a truly content-neutral provision) it
also restricted a particular subject of speech-i.e., the solicitation of money. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 643-44, 648-49. Moreover, in Regan, the Court held that restrictions

on the size and color of pictorial reproductions of U.S. currency were content-neutral
because of their facially neutral character, even though they only applied to one type
of expression-i.e., reproductions of U.S. currency. See 468 U.S. at 643-46, 655-58.
Finally, as noted earlier, in some cases where a content analysis has seemed warranted, the Court has simply ignored that issue and not even considered the content
character of the pertinent speech restrictions. See supra note 63; see also NLRB v.
Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980); id. at 616-19 (Blackmun
and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the result); infra note 201 and
accompanying text.
117 One could argue that this shift actually began between the Court's decisions in
Renton and Boos, in the case of San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987). There, the Court held that restrictions on certain uses of

the word "Olympic," even for political purposes, constituted an acceptable incidental
restriction on speech because the government's purpose was to encourage and reward the activities of the U.S. Olympic Committee by essentially giving them a recognized trademark. See id. at 536. Thus, although not explicitly relying on the Renton
government purpose test, the Court basically analyzed a facially discriminatory speech
restriction-one prohibiting the use of a specific word in certain contexts-as a
content-neutral restraint.
118 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
119

Id. at 791 (citation omitted).
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and unwise" reference to that case, expressing "fear that its broad application may encourage widespread official censorship" 1 2 0-the
Court observed that "[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to
the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others."'12 1 In other
words, a regulation that drew distinctions based on content could still
be considered content-neutral and subjected to relaxed scrutiny if it
could be justified by purposes unrelated to the content of the restricted speech. By importing this part of Renton without an explicit
secondary effects qualifier, the Court threw the door wide open to
content-neutral defenses for selective content restrictions.
Since Ward itself dealt with a regulation of speech that was content-neutral on its face, 12 2 the government next walked through this
door a year later in United States v. Kokinda.1 2 3 There, a plurality held
that a regulation which barred persons from "soliciting alms and contributions" on sidewalks used to gain access to post offices was content-neutral, largely because the government's purpose was to address
the allegedly disruptive nature of solicitation which it claimed created
discomfort for postal service patrons and impaired postal service efficiency. 12 4 Among other things, the four dissenting Justices argued
that the regulation was content-based, first because it singled out certain content on its face for special treatment, and second because
under Boos the government's concern with solicitation turned on its
communicative effect on listeners.1 25 The dissent certainly seemed
correct that the regulation was a selective content restriction-applying solely to speech which had as its subject the solicitation of
money-and that it did appear to be heavily concerned with the com120 Id. at 804 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 791 (majority opinion).
122 Ward involved a regulation controlling the volume of band shell performances
in a public park. See id. at 784.
123 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
124 See id. at 724, 732-37 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 738-39 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment). FourJustices in the plurality determined that the sidewalk was a nonpublic forum-a place where the government normally has greater
latitude to regulate speech on the basis of content, see supra note 5-but nonetheless
determined that the restriction at issue was content-neutral because of the purpose of
the regulation and the fact that it was viewpoint neutral. See id. at 730 (plurality opinion). Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy thought that the sidewalk may
have been a public forum, but nonetheless determined that the restriction was content-neutral without explaining why. See id. at 737-39 (KennedyJ., concurring in the
judgment).
125 See id. at 740, 753-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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municative impact of such speech on postal service customers. 126 Re-

markably, the majority simply ignored these objections. The implied
message of Kokinda seemed to be that facially discriminatory regulations, even if they were justified by a communicative impact concern A
la Boos, might still be fair game for content-neutral treatment.
Indeed, in the last decade or so, employing some version of the
Ward government purpose test, the Court has determined (or at least
assumed) that many speech regulations that discriminate between
types of content on their face, or between groups of speakers where
the differential treatment amounted to content discrimination, were
content-neutral and reviewed them under more lenient standards of
review associated with that classification. Thus, the following selective
content restrictions were found or assumed to be content-neutral: a
ban on writing in a candidate of one's choice to promote electoral
efficiency; 127 a ban on displaying residential signs to preserve neighborhood esthetics that contained exceptions for signs containing certain content; 128 a requirement that cable television operators carry
local and educational broadcast channels to preserve diverse sources
of programming; 129 restrictions on the protests of anti-abortion activists in order to shield abortion clinic patients from undue importuning or harassment; 130 a ban on publishing illegally intercepted cell
126 That the postal service regulation at issue was content-based at least in the
sense of facially discriminating against certain subjects was made even more clear
when its entire scope was considered-it not only banned solicitation, but also political campaign speech and commercial speech. See id. at 724 (plurality opinion). However, only the part of the regulation dealing with solicitation was being challenged in
the case.
127 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992). Even though the Court in
Burdick determined that the speech restriction at issue was content-neutral, it was not
applying a standard content analysis in that case. Rather, the Court was reviewing the
case under a line of decisions recognizing a First Amendment "right to vote" where
the Court applies traditional strict scrutiny to election regulations deemed to impose
a severe burden on that right, and a form of intermediate scrutiny to those regulations deemed to impose reasonable and nondiscriminatory burdens on that right. See
id. at 434.
128 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51-53 (1994). As noted earlier, however, Gilleo was one of the rare cases where the Court has invalidated a speech restriction pursuant to standard content-neutral review. See supra note 90.
129 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).
130 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-25 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 371-74 (1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
512 U.S. 753, 762-64 (1994). As noted earlier, in Madsen and Schenck the Court departed from its normal analysis and applied a heightened standard of review to both
uphold and invalidate various restrictions it had determined to be content-neutral
under a government purpose analysis. See supra note 90. That standard was stricter
than the Court's normal content-neutral test but more lenient than a strict scrutiny
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phone conversations to preserve communications privacy; 3 1 and a
prohibition on more than one adult businesses operating in the same
13 2
building to address deleterious effects on the neighborhood.
And even though in several of these cases the government
seemed to be addressing concerns arising from the communicative
impact of the regulated speech on listeners as per Boos-facilitating
the receipt of a more diverse array of programming by cable viewers,
protecting abortion clinic patients from emotional and psychological
harm, and guarding against the loss of privacy experienced by those
cell phone users whose conversations were heard by others-the
Court ignored these conceptual problems even in the face of vigorous
dissents on these points. 133 Moreover, none of these cases seemed to
involve a Renton secondary effects justification for labeling a facially
discriminatory regulation content-neutral, except for the one involving the adult business zoning restriction.
By marked contrast, in a different line of cases dealing with
facially discriminatory speech regulations, rather than applying a
Ward-type purpose analysis for determining content neutrality, the
Court has adhered to its post-Mosley approach of regarding such regulations as being content-based by definition-without any consideration of the government's purpose for enacting them. Indeed, in some
of these cases the Court has gone so far as to suggest that an alleged
governmental purpose to favor or disfavor certain types of speech is
not essential to a finding that content-based regulations violate the
First Amendment.134 Thus, the following regulations were deemed to
standard of review. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 371-74; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764-66. In
Hill, on the other hand, the Court upheld speech restrictions on abortion protesters
pursuant to standard content-neutral review. 530 U.S. at 719-25.
131 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-27 (2001). Similarly, in Bartnicki the
Court departed from its normal analysis and applied a more stringent standard of
review to hold the restriction at issue unconstitutional even though that body had
determined it to be content-neutral under a government purpose analysis. See supra
note 90.
132 See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 433-42 (2002) (plurality
opinion) (remanding to allow consideration of content status but assuming applicability of Renton).
133 At least this was true as to the regulations affecting cable television operators
and abortion protesters. See, e.g., Hill, 530, U.S. at 746-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id.
at 770 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Turner Broadcasting,512 U.S. at 678 (O'Connor, J,,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). There was no need for a dissent on this
point as to the cell phone regulation since the Court held the statute unconstitutional
as applied in that case despite its determination that it was content-neutral. See supra
note 131.
134 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) ("[O]ur cases have consistently held that [i]llicit legislative
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be content-based without any examination of whether the government's reason for enacting them could be regarded as content-neutral: a tax exemption applicable to some types of magazines but not
others; 13 5 regulations to prevent the exposure by minors to sexually
explicit materials;13 6 financial restrictions on works by criminals that
described their crimes;13 7 restrictions on campaign speech around
voting stations; 3- 8 restrictions on the placement of magazine racks apintent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment. Simon &
Schuster need adduce no evidence of an improper censorial motive .... [E]ven regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of
rights protected by the First Amendment." (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Some might argue that this "sine qua non" assertion, which the
Court has made in a few different cases dealing mainly with differential taxes imposed
on the press and other media, demonstrates that a concern about improper governmental motives is not the only or even predominant concern underlying the Court's
stringent treatment of content-based restrictions. But the problem with this argument is that the Court has never clearly explained how that statement relates to the
issue of content discrimination. In the first three cases where the Court used the
"sine qua non" phrase it was in the context of explaining that differential taxes placed
on the press or members within it were problematic because of the danger that the
government could use such taxes to "suppress the expression of particular ideas or
viewpoints." Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444-47 (1991) (discussing line of
cases where the phrase was used). The Court interpreted that phrase to mean that
"direct evidence of improper censorial motive" was not required to invalidate such
differential taxes because of the risk of censorial abuse posed by them-even if such
taxes were actually based on proper motives. See id. at 445; Ark. Writers' Project, Inc.
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987). Although the differential taxation problem was
independent of the issue of content discrimination in these cases, the Court noted
that the risk of abuse presented by such taxation was only aggravated when the basis
for the differential treatment turned on the content of the publications at issue. See
Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447; Ark. Writers'Project,481 U.S. at 229-31. It was in this sense of
content-based "discriminatory financial treatment" that the Court appeared to use the
"sine qua non" phrase in the Simon & Schuster case quoted above. See Simon &
Schuster, 502 U.S. at 117. Thus, to the extent that the Court has linked the "sine qua
non" phrase to the problem of content discrimination, it has been because of the very
same reason that it views all forms of content discrimination as being problematici.e., the risk that such discrimination could be based on an improper censorial purpose. See also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 794 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting the "sine
qua non" statement as meaning that "[tihe vice of content-based legislation-what
renders it deserving of the high standard of strict scrutiny-is not that it is always used
for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those purposes."). Accordingly, far from undermining the claim that the Court's overall content approach is driven primarily by a concern for improper government motives, its
use of the "sine qua non" phrase has actually supported it.
135 See Ark. Writers'Project,481 U.S. at 229-31.
136 See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117-26 (1989).
137 See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115-18.
138 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196-98 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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plicable only to publications dedicated to commercial advertising;1 3 9
restrictions on the campaign speech of persons running for elected
judgeships; 140 and information disclosure requirements deemed inherently content-based because they compelled specific speech by
people.1 4 1 This preemptory content treatment was especially striking
in light of the fact that at least some of these regulations seemed to be
motivated by a government purpose having little to do with preferring
142
or disadvantaging certain ideas or messages for illegitimate reasons.
Finally, in yet another line of cases involving selective content restrictions, the Court has determined that they were content-based by
looking at both the facially discriminatory nature of it and the government purpose, but only when that purpose could be characterized as
being concerned with the communicative effects of the speech-and
thus consistent with a content-based finding.1 43 Aspects of all these
different approaches to assessing the content status of a facially discriminatory regulation can be found in a Delphic, cryptic formulation
the Court has expressed in rare but unsuccessful attempts to reconcile
them:
Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task ....

As a general rule, laws

that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content
based. In determining whether a regulation is content based or
139 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428-31 (1993)
(relying mainly on a facial discrimination standard to classify the regulation at issue as
content-based, but also examining and disregarding the asserted government purpose
when it did not appear to be reasonably related to the content distinction drawn in
the regulation).
140 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 773-74 (2002).
141 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343-47 (1995); Riley v.
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795-98 (1988).
142 See infra text accompanying notes 165-76, 222-23 for an elaboration of this
point. This seemed especially true, though not exclusively, as to those restrictions on
campaign speech-both around voting stations and by campaigning judges-that applied to all different viewpoints and political perspectives.
143 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-13 (2000);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-95 (1992); Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133-36 (1992); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-21 (1988)
(plurality opinion). Although the parade permit regulation in Nationalist Movement
that required a fee up to $1,000 per day to cover the anticipated cost of security for
the event did not directly discriminate against certain types of content on its face, it
indirectly did since the specific amount assessed depended on how controversial the
"'content of the [parade's] message"' was determined to be by the government.
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 134 (quoting Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)).
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content neutral, we look to the purpose behind the regulation; typically, government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral
so long as it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.
But while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain
circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not
necessary to such a showing in all cases.... Nor will the mere asser-

tion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to save a law which, on
144
its face, discriminates based on content.
Thus, the Court itself has been unable to articulate a clear and principled basis for distinguishing between these approaches to facially discriminatory content regulations.
Although such facial content regulations constitute by far the
14 5
predominate form of speech restriction reviewed by the Court,
when it comes to a prototypical time, place, or manner regulation that
applies evenly to speakers and content, that body has been more consistent in its approach to determining content neutrality. Quite ironically, however, that approach is not the "ascertainment of government
purpose" one the Court relied on in Renton and trumpeted in Ward.
Indeed, Ward is the only case involving a facially content-neutral regulation of speech where the Court determined its characterization
based on the fact that the government purpose or justification was
unrelated to the content of the speech. 1 46 In every other case involving such regulations the Court, at least in its stated reasons, relied on
the fact that the terms of the regulation in question did not discriminate on the basis of speakers or content. Thus, despite its rhetoric
about analyzing government purpose in its standard content-neutral
test, the Court has fairly consistently used a facial standard to deter144 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 & n.9 (2001) (quoting Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 Just since Renton, and including that decision, in cases dealing with direct regulations of speech where their content status has been an issue, at least twenty-one
involved those that have made content distinctions on their face or involved speaker
discrimination that effectively constituted content discrimination. See supra notes
105-09, 110-15, 127-32, 135-41, 143 and accompanying text (discussing such cases).
By contrast, during that same period (since 1986) the Court appears to have reviewed
only four such speech regulations that did not make content distinctions on their
face. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (discussing such cases). I have
included Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002), and Forsyth County v.
NationalistMovement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), in this compilation even though these cases
technically involved alleged prior restraints, because the content status of the permitting schemes at issue there was a substantial factor in the outcomes of those decisions.
146 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791-93.
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mine the content status of facially neutral speech regulations.1 4 7 Ironically, the government purpose rhetoric is what the Court latched
onto in Renton to rationalize treating facially discriminatory content
restrictions as if they were content-neutral.
In sum, even though logic might suggest that a single test or standard should govern the determination as to whether a given speech
regulation is content-based or content-neutral, such has not been the
Court's approach in practice. When it comes to a speech restriction
that on its face applies only to, or makes a distinction regarding, a
particular type or types of content, after Renton and Boos the Court
may utilize one of three different approaches to the content neutrality
question: (1) it may treat the regulation as content-based by definition
because of its differential scope of application, (2) it may look solely
to the government's asserted purpose and treat the regulation as content-neutral if that purpose does not relate in a direct way to the content or substance of the speech, or (3) it may use a combination of
these two approaches if they both point to a finding that the regulation in question is content-based. As to these different approaches,
the Court has made no serious attempt to explain when and why it
may utilize one instead of another. By contrast, when it comes to a
speech regulation that on its face applies evenly to all types of content,
the Court has fairly consistently looked to the nondiscriminatory facial
character of that regulation to assess content neutrality, despite much
rhetoric requiring a government purpose analysis to make that
determination.
II.

THE

BICATEGORICAL CONTENT APPROACH: PROBLEMS OF THEORY
AND APPLICATION

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Court in Mosley,
whether intentionally or not, effected revolutionary changes in free
147 See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447-49 (1991); Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 481-82 (1988); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 804-05 (1984) (providing a confused analysis purporting to apply a standard of viewpoint neutrality and the O'Brien test for incidental restrictions on speech
to a time, place, and manner regulation, but nonetheless appearing to focus on the

content-neutral nature of the text to determine content neutrality); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 181 n.10 (1983); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-49 (1981) (identifying the government purpose test as the
applicable standard but actually looking at the terms of regulation to determine content neutrality); cf. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 320-23 (in case involving whether special procedural protections applied to a park permitting ordinance, the Court determined
the regulation was content-neutral by focusing on its nondiscriminatory text but also
noted that its "object" was unrelated to the content of speech).
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speech analysis which that body continues to struggle with today.
First, in that case and its progeny, the Court has essentially created a
bicategorical content approach to free speech jurisprudence, under
which the initial content characterization of a speech regulation is
generally dispositive of its constitutionality. Second, such an approach obviously requires a principled and theoretically sound
method for making such characterizations, something the Court has
yet to produce. The following sections will examine the problems associated with these issues in greater detail.
A.

The Bicategorical Content Approach and Free Speech Theory

It is useful to begin with first principles in our analysis of the desirability of a bicategorical content approach to implementing the
free speech guarantee of the First Amendment. Nearly everyone
agrees that a commitment to freedom of expression is an essential
component of a modern liberal democracy. In such a democracy, the
prevalent theory goes, free speech is vital at both a societal and individual level. As to the former, it is both necessary and desirable to
maintaining several related things: a free marketplace of public debate in order to facilitate the discovery of "truth," a free flow of ideas
and information necessary for citizens to make informed decisions
about self government, and a societal "safety valve" to funnel dissent
and demands for change into peaceful avenues.1 48 At an individual
level, it is not only important for these reasons, but also to allow people wide latitude in expressing themselves to foster personal development and self fulfillment.

49

At the same time, however, there is a similar consensus that such
freedom cannot be absolute in the sense of giving people the right to
say whatever they want to, and however, wherever, and whenever they
want to say it. The founders of the Constitution recognized this,1 50 as
has the Court by formally exempting certain content-based categories
of speech thought to be inherently harmful, "low value," or both,
from the full protection of the First Amendment: e.g., obscenity, child
pornography, defamation, fraud, incitement to unlawful action, fight148 See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAWV
4-7 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1999).
149 See id. at 7-8.
150 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) ("From 1791 to
the present ... our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are 'of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly

outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).
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ing words, and direct threats of violence or harm. 151 Even within the
realm of "fully" or "ordinarily" protected speech, the Court has recognized this principle by historically giving the government greater latitude in regulating the time, place, or manner of expressive activities
in order to prevent the undue infringement of the rights of others
152
resulting from the noncommunicative aspects of those activities.
In the post-Mosley era, then, the question becomes whether, in
the vast realm of ordinarily protected speech, a jurisprudence that effectively prohibits any form of content regulation, but allows most
forms of noncontent regulation, is the optimal way of maximizing the
benefits of free speech while minimizing its costs. To properly evaluate this, however, one must examine such an approach in the full context of other doctrines the Court has developed to protect private
speech-namely, the overbreadth, vagueness, and prior restraint doctrines. Irrespective of whether the government has attempted to regulate expressive activities on the basis of content or noncontent
considerations, these doctrines prohibit the government from, respectively, regulating too much expressive activity in an attempt to address
a perceived problem, 153 regulating in terms that are unduly vague or
general as to the scope of the restricted activities, 154 and unduly impeding speech from occurring in the first place versus subsequently
55
punishing someone for violating a legitimate speech regulation.'
Moreover, an important principle associated with the latter two doctrines is the notion that government officials cannot be given undue
discretion to enforce speech restrictions against potential violators, allowing them to pick and choose among them based on factors such as
1 56
a like or dislike for the speech or speakers at issue.
The net effect of these supplemental doctrines is to require the
government to regulate protected expression with a threshold level of
precision and sensitivity to free speech interests, above and beyond demonstrating under content-based or content-neutral scrutiny that its
regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the pertinent government
interest. It is appropriate, then, to evaluate the content approach in
151 See id.
152 See supra notes 19, 77-78 and accompanying text.
153 See, e.g., VOLOKH, supra note 5, at 502-04.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 513-16. According to Professor Volokh, the Court has reserved the
term "prior restraint" to refer to content-based licensing or injunctive schemes that
restrain speech prior to an adequate determination that the content is unprotected
under the First Amendment, see id. at 516, thus providing further protections against
content regulation by the government.
156 See id. at 502-04, 514-15.
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light of the purposes of the First Amendment and this threshold level
of care required of the government to regulate expressive activities.
1.

The Presumptive Invalidity of Content-Based Regulations and
Associated Coping Mechanisms

With respect to the general requirement of de facto content neutrality that has developed in the context of the bicategorical content
approach, it seems clear that it cannot be adequately justified under
prevailing theories of free expression. This is because such a principle pays no heed to the scope of the speech restriction at issue nor the
burden it places on the exercise of free speech rights (i.e., the effects a
content-based restriction might have on the goals of free expression),
nor the presence of apparent governmental motivations that might
have little to do with an improper censorial purpose (i.e., the motives
for imposing such a restriction). There is little doubt that an absolute
ban, or a broad restriction, on expressing or communicating particular information, ideas, or beliefs, would run a high risk of impairing
the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, inhibiting the
free flow of information necessary for citizens to make informed decisions about governance, stifling peaceful dissent, and preventing individuals from feeling fully developed and fulfilled.1 57 Such restrictions
might also present a high risk of improper government censorship
based on the self-interest of government officials, or on paternalistic,
moralistic, or ideological notions of what is good, bad, right, or wrong
1 58
for individuals capable of making such judgments for themselves.
But when the government regulates the expression or communication of particular content in limited circumstances for reasons that
seem plainly legitimate or present little risk of illegitimate government action, a virtually irrebutable presumption of unconstitutionality
seems indefensible. In other words, there would appear to be little
reason for subjecting regulations that pose seemingly minor threats to
the societal or individual goals of the First Amendment (presenting a
limited "effects" concern), and seek to achieve legitimate government
objectives (presenting a limited "motives" concern), to almost certain
invalidation just because they make a distinction based on content.
Thus, selective content regulations that seem to place a minor burden
on expressive freedoms, or represent reasonable time, place, or man157 See, e.g., Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, supra note 3, at 55 (observing that
complete bans on expressing certain viewpoints, for example, would "mutilate[ ] 'the

thinking process of the community'" (quoting
FREEDOM 27 (1960))).
158

See id. at 55-57.

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,

POLITICAL
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ner restrictions which leave open ample alternative avenues of communication, would seem to be poor candidates for the per se
invalidation usually accorded them under existing doctrine-at least
when they are justified by legitimate and important reasons such as to
protect vulnerable groups like minors from unsuitable content, enable governmental compliance with legal obligations, or159permit the
achievement of significant regulatory or economic goals.
Consider, for example, a recent pair of federal court of appeals
decisions that struck down regulations requiring the parental consent
or supervision of minors in order for the latter to purchase or have
access to exceptionally violent video games. 160 The courts invalidated
the regulations under strict scrutiny because they singled out such
content for regulation, even though they appeared to impose a fairly
minor burden on free speech rights in one particular medium of communication (minor, that is, in the view of most except the video game
manufacturers who did not want parents getting in the way of sales
and sued on First Amendment grounds).161 Certainly it would be difficult to argue that requiring parental consent before minors could
buy or access certain video games would prevent any ideas contained
in them from reaching the marketplace of debate for truth or selfgovernment purposes. Moreover, although the minors required to
get that consent might claim such a regulation stifles their ability to
voice social dissent or fully actualize themselves, parental guidance on
such means of dissent or self-development would seem to be something the law should encourage and not disparage. At the least, such
regulations deserve to be scrutinized under a jurisprudence that en159 See infra notes 165-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases where
the Court has invalidated regulations enacted for such purposes.
160 See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir.
2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); see also
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1043-44, 1048
(N.D.Cal. 2005) (summitrizing three recent federal district court decisions striking
down or enjoining laws restricting the access of minors to violent video games on First
Amendment grounds, and itself reaching the same result).
161

See Interactive Digital, 329 F.3d at 958-60; Am. Amusement, 244 F.3d at 574-80.

Arguably, the regulation at issue in American Amusement requiring parents to actually
accompany children who wished to play graphically violent video games in arcades,
imposed a more significant burden on expressive rights than the regulation at issue in
Interactive Digitalwhich only required the parental consent of minors wishing to buy,
rent, or play such games. However, nothing in the American Amusement decision
turned on the degree of the burden on First Amendment rights imposed by the regulation at issue there, and it seemed clear that the court would have reached the same
result even if the regulation had required mere parental consent rather than parental
accompaniment.
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courages a fair review of the asserted governmental interests and its
means of achieving them, rather than one that skews such a review by
instructing lower courts that content restrictions are virtually impossible to sustain.
Consider also laws currently being enacted by states that prohibit
picketing and demonstrating within a certain distance of funerals
shortly before and after a service. These laws are being passed in response to an alleged pastor and members of a church who are using
funerals of American soldiers killed in Iraq as opportunities to get out
their message that the war and soldiers' deaths constitute divine retri162
bution for the country's tolerant attitude towards homosexuals.
Apparently, the church group assembles across the street from such
funerals, engaging in expletive-laden chants and displaying signs containing messages such as "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Thank God
for IEDs" (improvised explosive devices that frequently kill soldiers),
and "God Hates Fags." 163 Under an honest application of current
doctrine, even though such regulations are facially content-neutral,
they would likely not withstand First Amendment scrutiny because
they would be very difficult to justify as being unrelated to the content
of the affected expression. 164 But even acknowledging that such regulations are content-based, can it seriously be argued that such a limited restriction would have a substantially adverse impact on the
marketplace of public debate, or on the church members' ability to
feel fully self-realized? Or that the government should not have the
right to enact such restrictions out of respect for the dead soldiers'
sacrifices, regardless of its views about the message being expressed?
Similar arguments about a minor burden or limited restriction
on speech, combined with an asserted government purpose that appears plainly legitimate or presents little risk of an illegitimate government motive-especially when considered in light of that minor
burden or limited restriction-could also be made about many of the
Court's rulings striking down content-based restrictions. Thus, its decisions such as those invalidating youth access safeguards on commercial pornography disseminated via Internet websites or cable
television, I65 restrictions designed to bring the government in compli162 Tim Hoover, Group Keeps Up FuneralProtests: New Laws No Deterrent, Member Says,
KANSAS CiTy STAR, Jan. 25, 2006, at B3; Jonathan Rivioli, Lawmakers OK Ban on Protests
at Funerals, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Feb, 22, 2006, at B4.

163 Hoover, supra note 162.
164 For instance, would such laws have been passed if a church group was holding
up signs reading "God Bless Our Soldiers" across from the funerals?
165 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); United States v. Playboy Entm't
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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ance with legal obligations such as those placed on religious uses of
government property 66 or protests at foreign embassies, 167 restrictions on profiting from books describing one's crimes both to compensate victims and prevent crime from paying,1 68 fees designed to
recoup a fraction of parade policing costs,'

69

tax exemptions meant to

jump start certain publications with limited readership, 1 70 and requirements that fundraisers disclose the amount of money ultimately
turned over to charities in whose name they raise money 171 would all
seem to fit this profile and be ill suited for a heavy presumption
against their constitutionality on account of "effects" or "motives"
172
concerns.
When it has sought to justify such heavy handed treatment of
content regulations imposing minor burdens or limited time, place,
or manner restrictions on expressive rights, the Court has failed to do
so in a convincing way. For instance, responding to such a "minor
166 See, for example, Good News Club v. Milford Central School 533 U.S. 98 (2001)
and other cases discussed at supra note 66 and in accompanying text.
167 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). It may well be that a court would determine that the restricted area for demonstrating in Boos was indeed a heavy burden for
those wishing to protest foreign government policy at their embassies, and was not
justified by sufficient countervailing interests. My point is simply that the limited nature of the burden being imposed (a "place" restriction), combined with a plainly
legitimate reason for imposing it, did not warrant the virtual per se invalidation accorded by the bicategorical content approach. See infra note 172.
168 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991). Once again, this is not to say that the restriction in this case should
have ultimately been sustained, especially since it appeared to be substantially overbroad as written. See id. at 121-22. As I reiterate later, see infra note 172, the limited
nature of the restriction (not a ban but rather a requirement that victims be compensated before the criminal) and legitimate purpose for imposing it did not warrant a
heavy presumption of unconstitutionality simply because it singled out certain speech
for special treatment.
169 See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1987).
170 See Ark. Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
171 See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
172 To reiterate, this is not to say that all of the noted regulations should have
been upheld by the Court. It is simply to say that the limited nature of the burden or
restriction they appeared to impose, combined with a plainly legitimate government
purpose for enacting them, at least entitled such regulations to a "fair hearing" regarding their constitutionality as opposed to the preemptory treatment typically accorded them by the bicategorical content approach. Cf United States v. Playboy
Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 846 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (complaining
about the Court's unrealistically stringent approach to content-based scrutiny in that
case and asserting that "First Amendment standards are rigorous.... Those standards
at their strictest make it difficult for the Government to prevail. But they do not make
it impossible for the Government to prevail").
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burden" argument in a recent case the Court simply asserted that " [i] t
is of no moment that the statute does not impose a complete prohibition. The distinction between laws burdening and laws banning
speech is but a matter of degree. The Government's content-based
burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based
bans."' 73 But this response failed to recognize that, as noted earlier,
while bans certainly can seriously threaten the purposes of the First
Amendment, limited burdens often74do not. In other words, the de1
gree of the restriction does matter.
Similarly, as discussed in Part I, the Court explained early on that
time, place, or manner restrictions cannot be content-based because
such regulations "must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that
communication has not been prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views.'"1 75 However, as the Court itself

asserted in other cases, the fact that a speech regulation is of a limited
scope rather than a ban makes it less likely that it was motivated by
such a disapproval. 1 76 More importantly, this rationale holds little
water when such a regulation is reasonably justified by a plainly legitimate purpose, as was the case with many of those voided by the Court
on content discrimination grounds.
At least two leading commentators, however, have sought to justify the Court's heavy-handed treatment of content-based regulations
that appear to impose minor burdens or limited restrictions on
speech. Professor Geoffrey Stone has argued that even "modest content-based restrictions distort public debate in a content-differential
manner."' 7 7 Perhaps more importantly, he argues, it is too difficult
173 Id. at 812 (majority opinion).
174 Cf id. at 838 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[l]aws that burden
speech, say, by making speech less profitable, may create serious First Amendment
issues, but they are not the equivalent of an absolute ban on speech itself.... The
difference-between imposing a burden and enacting a ban-can matter even when
strict First Amendment rules are at issue").
175 Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (quoting
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
176 See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) ("As
Justice Powell observed in American Mini Theatres, '[i]f [the city] had been concerned
with restricting the message purveyed by adult theatres, it would have tried to close
them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to location."'
(quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.4 (1976))).
177

Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 3, at 55 (emphasis added).

As

noted earlier, see supra note 3, Stone has also argued that the "distortion of public
debate" principle explains andjustifies the Court's overall content approach to speech
regulations (whether of a modest nature or not), or at least its stringent treatment of
content-based regulations of a viewpoint nature and its more deferential treatment of
content-neutral regulations, as much if not more than a concern about improper gov-
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for judges to tell how severe an effect a given regulation may have on
the vigor of public debate, 1 78 for example, or whether or not a regulation was motivated by an illegitimate purpose.17 9 The safest and wisest
course, then, is to "test all content-based restrictions of [protected]
speech with the same strict standards of review."' 8 0
As to Stone's first argument, as I will discuss later,1 8 1 many content-neutral restrictions on speech can differentially impact the expression of certain speakers even more than modest content-based
ones, yet as a general matter current doctrine does not view this as
constitutionally problematic. 182 Moreover, as Dean Elena Kagan has
cogently put it, if one is talking about a truly limited content-based
restriction, presumably "the small quantity of speech affected, combined with the ready availability of alternative means to communicate
the 'handicapped' idea, makes the danger of distortion insignificant." 183 Further, as Professor Stone himself acknowledges,1 84 restric-

tions based on general subject matters of speech (as opposed to
viewpoint restrictions) present less of a concern that they will skew the
public debate and yet current doctrine indiscriminately strikes down
both. But most importantly, even conceding there could be instances
where a modest content-based restriction might impede certain speakers from making their views part of public debate-for instance, the
protesters of foreign governments in Boos might argue that unless they
See id. at 55-57; Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 3, at
197-200. On a few occasions, the Court itself has also cited the distortion principle to
justify its stringent treatment of content-based regulations. E.g., Leathers v. Medlock,
ernment motivations.

499 U.S. 439, 488 (1991)

(asserting that the risk of content-based regulation is that

"[i] t will distort the market for ideas"). However, regardless of whether Stone is right
about the explanatory and normative virtues of the distortion principle vis-d-vis the
improper motives principle, see Kagan, supra note 3, at 445-56 (arguing that the latter
principle explains current doctrine much better than the former), for the reasons
discussed in the text I do not believe either principle justifies the Court's bicategorical
content approach at least to the extent of its virtually insurmountable presumption
against content-based regulations of any form no matter how modest a regulation it
may be or how legitimate the government's purpose may appear to be for imposing it.
178

Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, supra note 3, at 55.

179

Id. at 55-56.

180

See id. at 55-57; see also Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 3, at 217-27 (mak-

ing these arguments in more detail but only as to viewpoint-based restrictions).
181 See infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
182 Kagan, supra note 3, at 446; Redish, supra note 3, at 130-31.
183 Kagan, supra note 3, at 446.
184 Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 3, at 241 (asserting that the subject-matter
restrictions are "less likely than viewpoint-based restrictions to distort public debate in
a viewpoint-differential manner, to implicate constitutionally disfavored justifications,
or to be the product of improper motivation").
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could picket in front of the foreign embassies they would not be able
to effectively get their message out-as I will argue later, the most sensible solution would be to subject such restrictions to heightened scrutiny in these cases rather than to strike down all modest content-based
restrictions simply because there might be exceptional cases where
185
they do adversely impact public debate.
As to the difficulty of making assessments about the impact of a
modest content-based restriction on public debate, here Stone's arguments overlap to some extent with those made by Professor Eugene
Volokh on this subject. Both essentially argue that it is too difficult for
judges to make assessments about the modesty or severity of a contentbased restriction, and partially because of this difficulty, such determinations will likely be tainted by the judge's own ideological biases regarding the restricted speech (resulting in insufficient protection for
unpopular viewpoints). 186 Additionally, Professor Volokh argues, experience with the deferential treatment accorded to content-neutral
restrictions indicates that judges would be likely to underenforce a
requirement that there be ample alternative channels of communication left open with respect to the restricted speech, that such underenforcement would be more likely to adversely affect the
communication of unpopular viewpoints as to which restrictions
would be more politically feasible to enact, and that allowing modest
content-based restrictions would likely result in the "slippery slope" of
similar restrictions on the affected type of speech being imposed
where "the aggregate of all the restrictions can end up being quite
1 87

burdensome."
185

See infra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.

186 See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 3, at 225-27; Eugene Volokh, Speech as
Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances, "and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORINELL L. REv. 1277, 1307-10 (2005).

187 Volokh, supra note 186, at 1309. In addition to arguing that even purportedly
modest content-based regulations can significantly threaten free expression, Professor
Volokh also questions the ability of the improper motives principle to explain the
Court's overall treatment of content-based versus content-neutral regulations. See id.
at 1301-05. According to him, it is better explained by the premise that the right to
communicate lies at the core of the free speech guarantee, and thus punishing
speech for any harms that flow from the substance of a communication (i.e., from its
content)-and particularly from the capacity of a communication to persuade, inform, or offend someone-is presumptively unconstitutional. See id. at 1304. Moreover, at a more practical level, content-based restrictions can operate to burden
significantly more speech than content-neutral ones, because the former can restrict
speech across a variety of communication media and be sufficiently narrow to get
enacted from a political perspective, whereas the latter typically leave alternative media open for communication and are more politically difficult to enact since they
often affect a broad range of speakers. See id. at 1305-07.
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While these arguments certainly have some merit, ultimately I do
not believe they support placing all content-based restrictions of a
modest nature in the "content invalidation grinder." It is important
to recognize that both Professor Stone's and Professor Volokh's arguments appear to be directed mostly at restrictions of a viewpoint-based
nature. There is no doubt that even modest restrictions aimed at unpopular views, or even controversial subjects of speech like pornography, present an increased risk of discriminatory treatment. But this is
really a concern about improper motivation rather than skewing effects per se, 18 8 and as I note elsewhere many content-based restricThese are certainly cogent arguments but ultimately, I believe, not persuasive. In
his article, Volokh is focusing on generally applicable laws that address certain harms
regardless of whether they are caused by speech or conduct. Because in certain cases,
he argues, the Court held that the application of such laws to speech violated the First
Amendment and that such laws were obviously not improperly motivated since they
applied regardless of whether the harms were caused by speech or not, this then
proves that the Court's content approach is not driven by a concern for improper
motives but rather for a solicitude to the principle that if harm is caused by the content of a communication a law cannot constitutionally punish that speech. Stated
more succinctly, the Court's content approach is not based on concerns that the government may be restricting speech based on a mere disapproval of it instead of a
legitimate concern about the harm it may cause, but rather from a devotion to the
principle that communicative harm-being the offspring of the right to communicate-can rarely, if ever, be punished. There is no doubt that there is a small category
of cases involving generally applicable laws-especially those involving private tort actions against speakers-where the Court was more concerned about the restrictive
effects of those laws on the right to communicate than it was about motives concerns
because the government was not the party driving the application of those laws. But
there are also many cases involving generally applicable laws that were applied by the
government, like breach of the peace statutes, where the Court's invalidation of their
application could equally if not better be explained by its concern that they were
applied to speakers for improper reasons (instead of a legitimate and unbiased concern about the alleged communicative harm caused) rather than because the Court
was devoted to the principle of not punishing communicative harms. See also Kagan,
supra note 3, at 435-37, 461-64, 491-505. Indeed, the instances of more modern
cases discussed in the text where the Court seemed to ignore concerns about communicative harms in determining that the facially content-based speech restrictions at
issue were content-neutral appears to significantly undermine Volokh's position. See
supra notes 125-26, 132-33 and accompanying text; infta notes 232, 247-49, 251 and
accompanying text. With respect to Volokh's more practical explanation for the content approach, he himself appears to concede that this "effects-based" argument does
not account for the way current doctrine routinely strikes down modest content-based
restrictions that do not seem to present substantial effect concerns. SeeVolokh, supra
note 186, at 1307-10. And to the extent Volokh defends that practice with other
arguments, as noted in the text, those arguments seem to be largely based on concerns about improper motives.
188 See Kagan, supra note 3, at 447-56.
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tions-and particularly ones of a general subject-matter naturesimply do not present substantial motive concerns. To the extent they
do, such considerations should inform the rigor of scrutiny given to
such restrictions,Is 9 but they should not be a reason to invalidate all
content-based regulations.
With respect to concerns about evaluating distortion effects, as
noted above Stone himself acknowledges that subject-matter restrictions-much less ones of a modest nature-are less likely to skew public debate in favor of any particular outcome. Presumably, then, the
concern about being able to assess skewing effects also applies principally to viewpoint-based restrictions. So once again it is difficult to see
why this problem should dictate the stringent treatment of all contentbased regulations, especially when the rigor of scrutiny can be raised
to take into account the special problems associated with viewpointbased restrictions. Moreover, there are a number of other good reasons why the potential difficulties of assessing skewing effects should
not dictate a sweeping invalidation of all content-based restrictions:
some will be so modest in scope as to have plainly negligible effects, 190
such difficulties of measurement are similar for content-neutral regulations that have content-differential effects and yet are not viewed as
being problematic, and, as Dean Kagan has aptly stated, overall such
"measurement and line drawing.. . problems seem no more common
or intractable in this adjudicative context than in many others, where
no one thinks they preclude evaluative efforts."' 9 1 Finally, at least in
the context of current doctrine with its virtually insurmountable presumption that content-based regulations are invalid, to strike down
any modest restriction of this type because evaluative efforts will inherently be somewhat imprecise seems too high a price to pay in terms of
preventing the government from dealing with harms resulting from
192
speech that it may legitimately take action to address.
In sum, it is difficult to justify the Court's sweeping and rigid categorical approach to any speech regulation that makes a distinction
189 See infra text accompanying notes 284-89 for a discussion of my proposals
along these lines.
190 See, e.g.,
Kagan, supra note 3, at 420 (describing ban on using certain symbols
to express racist and other types of "hate speech" as "very modest" and noting that
"[r]acists can continue to communicate their message in many ways; we need have no
worry that the St. Paul ordinance will excise the idea of racism from public discourse"); see also id. at 447 (discussing factors involved in determining the practical
significance of a particular restriction on speech).
191 Id. at 447.
192 Cf id. at 428-32 (discussing speech harms the government may legitimately
address).
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based on content, either as a matter of First Amendment theory or
notions of illegitimate government action. While hypothetical content restrictions can be conjured up that present serious threats to the
societal or individual purposes of that amendment (such as a flat ban
on discussing certain subjects) or are plainly motivated by illegitimate
government purposes (such as a prohibition on expressing views critical of the government), many of the content restrictions that have
been invalidated by the Court have not come close to these extremes.
Yet the current approach towards content restrictions is geared to
such situations, making it a poor tool for addressing the myriad content restrictions that are motivated by legitimate concerns and do not
typically represent flat bans or sweeping restrictions on speech-especially since such restrictions must first pass the overbreadth, vagueness,
and prior restraint hurdles before even being subjected to contentbased review. 193
It is perhaps for these reasons that the Court has developed certain coping mechanisms-some overt, others covert or unarticulated-to avoid the rigid strictures of its content rule when a selective
content regulation appears to pose a minor threat to the principles
animating that rule. First and foremost, as described earlier, the
Court in many cases has taken to a government purpose analysis to
assess the content-based nature of facially discriminatory content restrictions. Since it could be argued that the latter type of restrictions
are content-based under a literal reading of that phrase, a purpose
analysis allows the Court to deal with content restrictions posing limited concerns by determining that they are content-neutral-particularly when it might otherwise appear ludicrous to presumptively strike
them down under the content sledgehammer. 19 4 The problems of inconsistency in the Court's application of the purpose analysis, however, will be addressed further in the next section. Moreover, even in
cases when regulations have not made facial content distinctions and
the Court has applied a purpose analysis, but strong evidence existed

193 See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
194 For instance, it would have seemed ludicrous to presumptively strike down the
antidisclosure law in Bartnicki, the must-carry cable regulations in Turner Broadcasting,
the residential sign ordinance in Gilleo, the candidate write-in prohibition in Burdick,
and the antisolicitation ordinance in Kokinda simply because they restricted content
of a particular type on the face of those regulations. Thus, determining that these
laws were content-neutral allowed the Court to avoid that result. See supra notes 90,
99, 123-29, 131 and accompanying text for a description of these cases.
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that a purpose did exist to regulate certain content, the Court has still
19 5
escaped the rigid content rule by calling them content-neutral.
Another popular coping technique the Court (or pluralities
thereof) has used to avoid content-based treatment is to emphasize
the viewpoint neutrality of a restriction singling out expressive subject
matter for regulation, usually in combination with some special considerations the Court finds to warrant a different approach such as the
evolving nature of communications technology,' 9 6 special problems
with a particular communications media, 1 97 or the low value of the
speech being restricted. 19 8 Other coping mechanisms the Court appears to have used from time to time include creating and applying a
unique standard of scrutiny of indeterminate origin to content regulations, I 99 finding that seemingly public places are actually nonpublic
forums where greater content regulation is permitted, 20 0 and simply
ignoring altogether the content-based character of a speech regulation in reviewing it.201 Obviously, such techniques for avoiding the
rigid strictures of the content rule are not ideal, since most are of an
ad hoc nature and create substantial uncertainty as to if and how they
might be applied to sustain a given content regulation.
195 For example, the ban on public nudity upheld in Pap'scausing erotic dancers
to wear pasties and G-strings, and the antipicketing ordinance applied to abortion
protesters picketing a doctor's residence in Frisby, both raised concerns of content
regulation but were treated as content-neutral by the Court. See supra notes 91 and
94 and accompanying text for a description of these cases.
196 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
743-47 (1996) (plurality opinion).
197 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-51 (1978) (plurality opinion).
198 See id. at 746-47; Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 52-53, 63 (1976)
(plurality opinion).
199

See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 737-66 (plural-

ity opinion) (applying overall balancing approach to content-based regulations).
200 See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674-85
(1992) (airport terminals treated as nonpublic forums for purposes of reviewing, inter alia, ban on soliciting funds); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 214-16 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that streets and sidewalks around
voting stations are not public forums).
201 See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999)
(ignoring general subject matter nature of restrictions placed on political speech of
petition circulators in striking them down under general balancing test). Moreover,
in the area of regulating political contributions that implicate both free speech and
expressive association interests, the Court generally ignores the fact that such restrictions are based on a general subject matter distinction-contributions made to facilitate politicalexpression. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003); see also supra
note 63.
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The Presumptive Validity of Content-Neutral Regulations and
Associated Coping Mechanisms

On the other side of the coin, just as it is difficult to defend,
under central theories and principles of the First Amendment, ajurisprudence that invariably strikes down any regulation of content, it is
equally hard to justify an approach that is strongly predisposed to upholding a regulation because it targets communicative methods or circumstances rather than content. As to concerns about the effects
such regulations can have on the goals of that Amendment, it seems
clear that broad restrictions or significant burdens placed on the use
of important mediums of communication such as the Internet can stifle the vigorous flow of ideas and information necessary to maintain a
well-functioning marketplace of public debate. 20 2 Indeed, as noted
earlier, a limited content restriction can have much less severe effect
on that flow than a broad restriction on popular avenues of expression. Even a more targeted restriction on particular methods of or
places for communication that are normally used by certain speakers
or groups lacking resources or skills to exploit more popular means
can inhibit particular viewpoints or perspectives from reaching that
20 3
marketplace.
Moreover, certain ideas and information have their most powerful impact when they are expressed at particular times, or in certain
places or ways. One common example is news of recent events, where
any regulations that cause reporting delays could result in such information losing much of its news value and interest. Thus, even limited
restrictions that prevent communications from occurring at particular
time or places, or in certain ways, when they would otherwise have
their strongest effect on public consideration and debate, can significantly threaten First Amendment goals. This concern is particularly
poignant as to avenues of social dissent, such as demonstrations that
are timed to coincide with other events like political conventions or
meetings. Similarly, it seems clear that restrictions on an individual's
modes of expressing herself have the ability to impair her self-fulfillment and development as much if not more than limited content restrictions. For instance, it would not do to tell a watercolor painter
that she should not be troubled by a ban on making watercolor paintings because she was still free to generate computer graphics or do
pencil drawings of the same subject matter.
202 See generally Redish, supra note 3.
203 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 313-14 & n.14
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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With respect to concerns about illegitimate government motivations, regulations that apply evenly to all speech or speakers at particular times or using a particular place or medium of communication
generally pose less risk of improper motivation than selective content
restrictions. 20 4 But even here, as noted earlier, such restrictions can
still be crafted to apply disproportionately to certain speakers, or to
lessen the impact of certain speech, making it necessary to scrutinize
even seemingly legitimate government justifications with some care.
Moreover, even regulations that seem to pose minimal effects or motivation concerns as written can be selectively enforced against certain
speech or speakers disfavored by government officials.
Accordingly, it is apparent that regulations determined to be content-neutral because they apply to speech of any type and can be justified by noncontent considerations, should not be accorded a strong
presumption of validity as is the case under the Court's current content-neutral jurisprudence. More disturbing, however, is the Court's
post-Renton practice of applying this presumption to facially contentbased regulations that are determined to be content-neutral under a
government purpose analysis. 20 5 Although, as discussed earlier, such
regulations frequently do not merit a strong presumption of invalidity
under the rule against content regulation, nor do they merit what typically amounts to a free pass under the Court's relaxed form of content-neutral review. Such regulations do, after all, place selective
restrictions on certain forms of content and merit some form of meaningful scrutiny for this reason alone, in addition to the reasons discussed for carefully scrutinizing facially content-neutral regulations.
Moreover, as noted before, since the Court began treating some
facially content-based regulations as content-neutral in Renton, they
have become the most common form of speech regulation to which it
applies content-neutral review. 20 6 In other words, many content-neutral speech regulations that have been reviewed under more deferential scrutiny by the Court over the past two decades were actually
facially discriminatory in nature. This presents all the more reason for
content-neutral review to have actual teeth.
As it stands, the current test the Court applies to evaluate regulations it has determined to be content-neutral appears to do a poorjob
at quantifying restrictive effects or smoking out hidden motivations
that may be associated with them: it simply asks whether the asserted
government interest is substantial or important, whether there seems
204

See, e.g., Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 3, at 56-57.

205
206

See supra notes 105-33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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to be a reasonable fit between the regulation and that interest, and
whether it leaves open ample alternative avenues of communication. 20 7 Since the first two elements are almost by definition easy to
satisfy, and alternative modes of communicating information and
ideas can almost always be imagined, it is not surprising that the Court
has found this test met in all but two cases. 20 8 Such a deferential level
of review seems inadequate, particularly with respect to certain facially
discriminatory regulations the Court has subjected to content-neutral
review that appeared to raise some risk that the government was indeed targeting the content-e.g., restrictions on adult bookstores and
theatres, 2 09 abortion protests at clinics, 2 10 solicitation activities of

fringe religious groups, 21 ' and the right of cable operators not to
21 2
carry local and educational television channels.
Perhaps in recognition of these problems with content-neutral review, and mirroring its approach to content-based regulations, the
Court seems to have adopted ad hoc coping mechanisms to avoid
such relaxed review of content-neutral regulations when they appear
to pose significant "effects" or "motives" concerns. For instance, as to
the former type of concern, even though the Court determined that a
restriction on disclosing intercepted telephone conversations was content-neutral, it found it to be unconstitutional under a more rigorous
review standard of indeterminate origin because it restricted too
much speech of public interest. 2 13 Similarly, in two cases that raised
motive concerns because lower courts had restricted the protest activities of abortion opponents, the Court applied a more rigorous standard of review that it deemed appropriate for reviewing contentneutral injunctions on speech to strike down certain restrictions while
at the same time upholding others. 2 14 Finally, in a case that also
raised motive concerns where Jehovah's Witnesses were required to
meet certain requirements prior to engaging in residential solicitation
activities, even though every lower court had determined the regulation was content-neutral, the Court declined to resolve that question
207 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
209 See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
210 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
211 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
212 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
213 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-35 (2001).
214 See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 372-74 (1997);
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764-68 (1994).
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and again invalidated it under a more stringent but uncertain level of
21 5
scrutiny.
3.

Other Jurisprudential and Conceptual Problems

Hence,just as a strict categorical approach to content-based regulations cannot be adequately justified under free speech theory and
associated principles, the same appears to be true for a deferential
categorical approach to content-neutral regulations. And beyond
these basic theoretical concerns with a bicategorical approach to free
speech analysis, there are a number of other jurisprudential and conceptual problems with it as well. The most obvious jurisprudential
one is the fact that when the constitutionality of a speech regulation is
generally preordained by its content characterization, it makes the
bulk of the Court's free speech analysis in a given case suspect. A
reader gets the distinct sense that the Court's evaluation of the asserted importance or need for a regulation, and the care with which it
was drafted, are essentially perfunctory analyses designed to rationalize the preordained result rather than to provide a truly objective and
critical analysis of those issues.
Moreover, in a typical decision the Court spends little time and
effort in analyzing and explaining the content characterization of a
regulation, even though that determination is doing most of the work
in a given case. Such unexplained determinations about critical issues
invite ad hoc and result-oriented adjudication of cases, since the consistent application of principles in different factual contexts becomes
impossible when the Court does not provide reasons for its decisions.
Additionally, such decisionmaking creates substantial uncertainty for
both the government and citizens about the constitutional validity of
potential or enacted speech regulations. These problems with a consistent and principled application of the content approach will be discussed in further depth in the next subpart of this Article.
At a more conceptual level, an exclusive and inordinate focus on
the principle of content neutrality in free speech analysis seems to
make little sense when one considers all of the other considerations
and factors that might be considered in balancing a person's right to
engage in free expression against competing interests the government
might have to limit that freedom. For example, in various free speech
analyses the Court might also consider other factors such as the character of the expressive activity, the context in which it takes place, and
215 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 162-69 (2002).
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the nature and scope of the government regulation at issue. 2 16 Yet it
has never provided a convincing account of why the principle of content neutrality should take such a dominant position amongst all of
these potential factors that might influence its decisions.
Further, the etymology of that principle makes it suspect as a generalfree speech doctrine. As described in Part I, the content neutrality principle was developed in Mosley and its key progeny as a response
to the differential treatment, based on content, of speakers who might
seek to engage in expressive activities in public forums. In this context, it makes eminent sense that the government should be forced to
treat similarly situated speakers (i.e., those desiring to engage in a certain expressive activity like picketing) equally from a content perspective since its main concern is with fairly allocating and preserving the
uses of the public sidewalks, streets, parks, or squares where that activity is taking place. The content of the expression a speaker is engaged
in is rarely relevant to such considerations. However, to do as the
Court did and, without discussion, analysis, or even acknowledgement
of the fact, blithely extend such a sweeping principle to general regulations of speech where more legitimate reasons exist to make content
217
distinctions seems inappropriate.
Finally, the Court's most common defense of a categorical content approach, at least as to content-based regulations, seems to be
that such a bright-line rule is the best way of preventing undue governmental interference with the liberty of expression-both to prevent the "slippery slope" of gradual encroachment on such freedoms,
and to provide for strong judicial enforcement through clear and consistent rules. 2 18 However, as will be discussed next, the principles governing the all-important content characterization itself are far from
consistent and clear. Indeed, they are extremely ambiguous and difficult to apply. Additionally, the slippery slope argument is mainly
rooted in concerns about illegitimate government motives: that once
an exception is made to permit the regulation of certain content beyond the categories already recognized as lacking full protection, government officials will build on this to argue for additional exceptions

216 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 428-31 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
217 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
218 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that the content discrimination principle "is a rule, in an area where
fairly precise rules are better than more discretionary and more subject balancing
tests," in principal part because of the risk of improper government motivation).
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that will be used to stifle expression
2 19
self-interests.
own
their
threatens
While such concerns have merit, as I will discuss in Part III, they
can be effectively managed without recourse to a sweeping and rigid
prophylactic rule that ties the government's hands in addressing content-related problems. An exclusive focus on these concerns, moreover, also ignores the threats to free expression that can be posed by
truly content-neutral regulations. And the problems are related, for
once a harsh categorical rule is adopted that strikes down any regulations of speech based on content, the natural tendency then becomes
to be forgiving of those regarded as content-neutral-a tendency that
is certainly reflected in the Court's decisions.
In sum, the Court's bicategorical content approach to assessing
the constitutionality of speech regulations cannot be adequately justified by the core theories and principles underlying the First Amendment and creates other difficult jurisprudential and conceptual
problems as well. But even if such an approach was the best way for
the Court to implement the free speech guarantee at a theoretical
level, the problems associated with distinguishing between contentbased and content-neutral regulations at a practical level might still
counsel a different approach. It is to those issues that I now turn.
B.

Problems of DistinguishingContent-Basedfrom ContentNeutral Regulations

Clearly, the Court's characterization of a given speech regulation
as being content-based or content-neutral is by far the most important
determination it makes in evaluating its constitutionality. It is surprising, then, that the Court has yet to explain or settle upon a consistent
and principled basis for making these determinations. To summarize
what was described earlier, 220 when it comes to the most common
form of speech regulation at issue in cases before the Court-one that
draws some sort of distinction based on content and thus typically
generates claims that it is content-based-it might utilize one of three
different approaches in determining its content status. It might (1)
determine it is content-based by sole reference to its discriminatory
scope; (2) ask whether the government can justify it with a purpose
unrelated to the speech's content, and if so, designate it as contentneutral; or (3) use a combination of both approaches when the second one points to a content-based finding (since the first will by definition point to such a result). With respect to speech regulations that
219
220

See supra notes 158, 186-92 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
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are facially neutral as to content-most typically consisting of the
"pure" form of time, place, or manner restriction-the Court typically
relies on its evenhanded scope alone to determine that it is contentneutral despite its rhetoric requiring a government purpose analysis.
1. Regulations that Single Out or Distinguish Between Types of
Content on Their Face
As to facially discriminatory regulations, to merely describe the
Court's approach is to identify its problems. If the three different approaches it might use pointed to consistent results in most cases, this
state of affairs might not be that much of a problem. But this is often
not the case, as attested to by the many facially discriminatory content
regulations the Court has determined to be content-neutral under a
government purpose analysis, and the many regulations it has determined to be content-based solely because of that facial discrimination.
This makes it vital to come up with a principled and logical method of
determining when the Court will look solely to the discriminatory nature of a regulation and when it will alternatively or additionally examine the asserted purpose for it. To search the Court's decisions for
such a standard, however, is to search in vain. Surprisingly, the Court
has not attempted any explicit defense of its practices in this regard,
other than the Delphic passage I quoted earlier that it has included in
22 1
a couple of cases.
To attempt to discern a pattern in its decisions that might justify
these different approaches seems equally futile. As discussed earlier,
the Court's main rationale for treating content-based regulations as
presumptively invalid is the danger of illegitimate government motivation-that it might use them to stifle disfavored speech or intentionally skew the marketplace of public debate in its favor. But many of
the selective content regulations labeled as content-based merely on
account of that selectivity seemed to pose little risk of improper motivation, while several of those found to be content-neutral appeared to
present a more substantial risk in this regard. 22 2 For instance, a ban
on announcing one's position on controversial issues while a candidate forjudicial office in order to preserve the impartiality of the judiciary, or a sales tax exemption given to certain types of magazines with
limited readership would seem to present much less risk of illegitimate motivation than restrictions on anti-abortion protestors or adult
221
222

See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75, 100, 142, 165-76, 195, 209-12 and accompanying text.
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bookstores. 223 But why was the government entitled to have its asserted purposes considered and held controlling in the latter cases,
but not in the former cases? Such a scheme smacks of irrationality
and arbitrariness. More saliently, it smacks of blind adherence to the
presumption against content regulation in the former cases, and results-oriented decisionmaking in the latter cases. A jurisprudence capable of such easy manipulation to reach such strikingly different
results is clearly undesirable.
The tension between the Court's facial invalidity and government
purpose lines of cases recently came to a dramatic head in Hill v. Colorado.2 24 There, the Colorado legislature had passed a law prohibiting
a person within 100 feet of an abortion clinic entrance from knowingly approaching within eight feet of another person, without her
consent, to pass "'a leaflet or handbill to, displa[y] a sign to, or engag[e] in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person.'- 2 25 The government justified the law as a measure to protect
access to healthcare services, the right of the patient to privacy from
unwanted and potentially traumatic communications, and to provide
the police with clear guidelines regarding improper patient harassment. 226 The law on its face clearly drew certain distinctions on the
basis of content: in terms of regulating oral communications, only
those desiring to engage in "'protest, education or counseling"' were
22 7
covered.
In a six-to-three decision, the Court upheld the statute under
content-neutral review as a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, determining that it was aimed at the manner of communication
and its associated harms rather than the substance of the speech. 228
In the principal dissent, Justice Scalia vigorously protested that the
prohibition on regulations 'justified by reference to content" 229 was
"in addition to, rather than in place of, the prohibition of facially content-based restrictions. ' 23 0 In other words, the purpose and facial tests
223 Compare Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), and Ark.
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987), with City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002), and Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
For a description of these cases, see supra notes 65, 72, 91-92, 130, 132, 135, 140, and
accompanying text.
224 530 U.S. 703.
225 Id. at 707 (quoting CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999)).
226 Id. at 719-20.
227 Id. at 747 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-122(3)).
228 Id. at 719-35 (majority opinion).
229 Id. at 747 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
230 Id.
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were not to be regarded as alternative standards but rather supplemental ones. In a separate dissent, Justice Kennedy similarly objected
that the statute was content-based because it restricted "speech on particular topics ....

[A] statute of broad application is not content-neu-

23 1
tral if its terms control the substance of the speaker's message."
The fact is, both the majority and the dissenters had it right in
terms of the applicable test of content neutrality because the Court's
precedents essentially allowed it to pick and choose between the facial
and purpose approaches. However, as also protested by the dissents,
in applying the purpose test the majority seemed to ignore the Boos
qualification which said that a government purpose addressing the direct communicative impact of speech on listeners-here on clinic patients-was content-based. 23 2 Problems with the Court's consistent
application of the communicative impact standard when applying the
government purpose test will be addressed later in this section.
Given this inconsistent use of different standards for making the
all-important content determination, the question then becomes
which one is the most desirable and defensible as a matter of free
speech law-the facial or purpose approach? Certainly the facial test
has the virtue of being a bright-line rule capable of a relatively consistent and principled administration by the courts. The test simply asks
whether a regulation of speech, by its terms, places a restriction, burden, or compulsion on a type or types of content that is not placed on
other types-either because it singles out certain content for regulation or subjects different types of content to differential treatment.
At least one major drawback with this approach, however, is that
it treats the many different types of content classifications that a regulation can make as presenting similar threats to First Amendment interests from both a motives and effects perspective. This is illogical.
As to concerns about improper government motives, certainly a viewpoint restriction will usually be more troubling than a subject matter
restriction, and a subject matter restriction that narrowly targets certain information or ideas will normally be more suspect than a more
general one like a restriction on "protest, education or counseling"
speech. 2 33 On the flip side, in general the broader speech restrictions
are, the greater the concerns will be about their effects on the proper
functioning of the marketplace of ideas or on an individual's ability to
engage in self-fulfilling expression.

231
232
233

Id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 747-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 770 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions, supra note 3, at 100-15.
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Further, as to both of these concerns, it is clear that they cannot
be properly assessed in a vacuum looking just at the content-based
character of a restriction. As discussed earlier, one must also assess
other characteristics of a speech regulation, such as its temporal, spatial, or other breadth of application, and the nature of the burden
being placed on engaging in the regulated expression. 234 Lastly, as
noted earlier, a regulation may draw content distinctions for reasons
having little to do with concerns about, or preferences for, the substance or message of the regulated expression. 2 35 In sum, it quickly
becomes apparent that a facial test for content discrimination, as it is
applied in the context of the current categorical approach, is simply
too blunt an instrument to ferret out the concerns driving that ap23 6
proach in the first place.
On the other hand, a government purpose test for determining
content neutrality is equally as problematic as a facial standard. Most
obviously, to call a facially content-based restriction "content-neutral"
flies in the face of common sense and is counterintuitive to one not
steeped in the complexities and nuances of free speech law. Such
legalistic doctrines can have a tendency to breed cynicism and disrespect for the law. Imagine a lawyer attempting to explain to her prolife client that the Court upheld the law in Hill primarily on the
grounds that the restrictions on his "protests, education and counseling" were not based on the content of his speech.
234 See supra notes 159-93 and accompanying text. As discussed below, current
doctrine largely fails to take such considerations into account. See infra notes 256-60
and accompanying text.
235 Take the peaceful labor picketers allegedly favored by the government in Police
Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 592 (1972). It seems much more likely that the government was using the phrase "labor picketing" as a shorthand way of describing a group
of picketers thought to pose less risk of disruption to schools than other types of
picketers, or of showing respect for a deeply ingrained conflict among important social institutions, rather than a preference for views or ideas associated with the labormanagement struggle. The vice of the regulation was its irrationality in exempting
only peaceful labor picketing instead of all peaceful picketing, or in preferring certain societal conflicts over others. But government ineptness or misguided motives is
not the same thing as having an illicit motive to prefer or disfavor certain expression,
and rules barring irrational government action, or misguided attempts to favor certain speakers for reasons unrelated to an agreement or disagreement with their message would have accomplished the Court's objectives without creating a sweeping
prohibition on laws that draw content distinctions. In other words, Mosley was a substantial overreaction to a misguided government regulation.
236 Notwithstanding these difficulties with a facial test for content discrimination,
however, as discussed in Part III of this Article, I ultimately conclude that such a test is
preferable to a government purpose test when employed within the context of a modified approach to free speech analysis that factors in all of these concerns.
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More importantly, the government's asserted purpose for a regulation is a very imperfect proxy of government motivation. It hardly
needs pointing out that it is normally not difficult to come up with a
reasonable sounding content-neutral justification for a regulation that
is covertly designed to suppress certain expression. The Court, moreover, is usually reluctant to question or inquire into the true motivations of its co-equal branches of government, even if a predominant
motive did exist that differed from the asserted purpose for a regulation. Thus the Court normally evaluates the content neutrality of that
purpose at its face value, even in the presence of evidence suggesting
an intent to disfavor protected speech. 23 7 This obviously diminishes
the value and effectiveness of the government purpose test as a
method for identifying improperly motivated speech restrictions. 238
Additionally, the government purpose test as defined is almost as
overbroad as the facial test as a tool to ferret out illegitimate speech
restrictions, and as applied by the Court to facially discriminatory content regulations is usually a fiction in any event. As defined, the Court
usually asks whether a given restriction "can be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech," which has been interpreted to mean the asserted purpose must be "unrelated" to that
content. 239 But as discussed above, speech regulations can certainly
be related to the content of speech for a number of legitimate reasons, including to address certain harms associated with particular
content. As defined, then, this standard seems to amount to a de
facto standard of facial content neutrality.
As applied, however, the Court's decisions seem to reveal this
standard for the fiction it is when used to adjudge a facially discriminatory content restriction as being content-neutral. This is because a
speech regulation that by its terms singles out or exempts particular
content, usually does it for reasons related to that content. Thus,
whether one describes a regulation as addressing the primary effects
or secondary effects of speech of a particular content it is still addressing the effects of that type of speech. To call a selective content restriction "content-neutral" because it purportedly targets the
237 A classic example of this is the Court's decision in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), where the Court refused to view a draft card law as related to the
suppression of speech even when Congress had amended it to take into account
protesters that willfully destroyed it as a political protest. See id. at 375.
238 However, it does not make it useless because presumably purposes and motives
will often be aligned, and even when they are not an asserted purpose must normally
appear to reasonably achieve a legitimate objective.
239 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Heffron v. Int'l
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).
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"secondary effects" of the speech is oxymoronic-it is by definition
targeting effects associated with the selected type of speech. It is little
wonder that several Justices, even ones that have voted to uphold restrictions on adult bookstores and nude dancing establishments under
that rationale, have conceded that calling such regulations contentneutral is a "fiction. 2 4 °
But this problem is not limited to the Court's so-called "secondary effects doctrine" which has only formally been applied to restrictions on certain forms of sexual speech. Laws that selectively regulate
content almost always do so for reasons related to that content. For
instance, if a city bans the use of all signs to address its esthetic interest
in preventing visual clutter, but makes exceptions for signs of a specified content that purportedly are limited in number by their nature, 2 4 1 the city is implicitly saying that signs of any content other than
the exempted ones create an unacceptable esthetic problem while the
exempted content categories do not. While one might readily accept
that the city is unconcerned with any particular messages or ideas contained in the restricted signs or the primary effects on viewers of that
message, it is certainly concerned with secondary effects of an esthetic
nature that are associated with signs of the restricted content.
Or in Hill v. Colorado,24 2 although the government did seem to be
genuinely concerned with the physical, emotional, and psychological
aspects of closely approaching an abortion clinic patient in combination with the substance of the speech that protestors would be likely to
address to her, the Court's determination that this restriction was "unrelated" to the content of that speech rivaled Lewis Carroll's efforts in
Alice in Wonderland. Here, it seemed beyond peradventure that the
government was concerned about the primary effects of the restricted
speech on the patient, in combination with a physical approach.
Thus, to ignore the content concern and focus solely on the physical
concern to determine that the restriction was unrelated to the content
of the regulated speech defied common sense. On the other hand,
the Court's desired result made complete sense-it is easy to understand why the majority was not willing to place a rather limited restriction on communicating emotionally loaded views to a person already
in a vulnerable state in the "content-based invalidation grinder." This
case is the poster child, then, for a deeply flawed free speech doctrine
240 See, e.g.,
City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (KennedyJ., concurring) ("The fiction that this sort of ordinance is content neutral ... is
perhaps more confusing than helpful ....").
241
Cf.City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 53 (1994) (assuming for purposes of
decision that such an ordinance was content-neutral).
242 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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rather than a Court that took leave of its common sense in calling the
restriction at issue "content-neutral."
What the Court really seems to be asking with the government
purpose test for content neutrality is not whether the restriction is
unrelated to the content of the regulated speech, but rather if it was
primarily motivated by an ideological or moralistic agreement or disagreement with the message or communicative substance of the
speech. Under this standard, again it is easy to see how the majority in
Hill believed that a speech restriction which seemed to be a reasonable compromise between privacy and free speech interests was content-neutral in the sense of not being illegitimately motivated. The
Court's concerns about inquiring into true government motivation,
however, prevented it from using such an honest standard. But the
case points up the problem with using an unrealistic standard that
asks whether a selective content regulation can be justified without
reference to that content. As will be discussed later, one obvious answer to this problem is for the Court to reform the content approach
24 3
to allow for limited regulations of content for legitimate reasons.
This discussion also points up a big problem with the Boos "communicative impact" standard for assessing content neutrality. Simply
put, that standard was designed to prevent the government from justifying selective content restrictions by arguing that "we weren't concerned with the content, but rather with harmful effects or
consequences it has on listeners." In other words, the government
cannotjustify a speech regulation as being unrelated to content if the
asserted purpose for it is to address the direct or primary effects of
that speech on recipients, because that is a concern about the communicative substance of the speech. 244 The problem with this standard,
as with the more general "unrelated to content" standard from which
it is derived, is that it is a poor, overly broad device for rooting out
illegitimate government motivation when considered in the context of
the inflexible, categorical content approach critiqued earlier.
Certainly there is a substantial risk that the government might
attempt to hide mere ideological, moralistic, or paternalistic disapproval of commercial pornography or a Muslim Imam's railings
against Western policies behind stated concerns about, respectively,
emotional or psychological injuries to minors or the threat of Muslim
listeners being led to commit terrorist acts. In other words, there are
many cases where it is difficult to distinguish between a legitimate concern for truly serious harms that might result from certain speech
243
244

See infra Part III.B.
See, e.g., SULLIVAN &

GUNTHER,

supra note 148, at 197-98.
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(harms that have not already been addressed by established categories
of "unprotected low value" content), and an illegitimate concern
about the moral, religious, or political value of the expression itself.
And often a regulation may be the product of mixed motivations, so
that it would be impossible to distinguish between proper and improper concerns in any event.
Such communicative effects cases, then, are probably the most
deserving of a true strict scrutiny review that would make a careful,
objective, and unbiased analysis of the importance of the asserted government interests and the manner in which it sought to achieve them,
weighed against the free speech interests present in a case. Under the
strong presumption of invalidity that is the hallmark of the categorical
content approach, however, as discussed earlier, these analyses typically seem skewed towards reaching the result preordained by that
presumption. Moreover, the Court's strict scrutiny test does not even
constitute a true weighing of the competing interests. Once a cognizable speech violation is alleged, the burden of proof is placed entirely on the government to demonstrate the necessity or adequacy of
its interests supporting the regulation and the precision of its drafting
to avoid restricting too much speech. 2 45 In other words, this standard
lacks any formal means for taking into account the fact that a given
content restriction might impose a limited burden on speech or be
relatively narrow in its scope of operation (e.g., apply only to a specific
medium of communication).246

Thus, the communicative impact standard suffers from vices similar to a more straightforward application of the "unrelated to content"
test to selective content restrictions: in theory, at least, it indiscriminately strikes down most such restrictions justified on grounds of communicative effects regardless of whether they seem motivated and
supported by legitimate concerns. This seems to explain why, in practice, the Court appears to ignore communicative effects concerns with
selective content restrictions unless it has already adjudged them to be
content-based using the facial discrimination test. 24 7 Such inconsis-

tency in applying a standard designed to ascertain content neutrality,
particularly when the Court appears to ignore it if it does not support

245 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665 (2004). In some cases involving
strict scrutiny, the Court also considers whether a content regulation restricts too little
speech in a way that calls into question the importance of the government's asserted
interests. See, e.g., VOLOKIH, supra note 5, at 225, 228-29.
246 See infra text accompanying notes 256-60 for a further discussion of this issue.
247

See supra notes 125-26, 132-33, 232 and accompanying text.
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such a finding when it has been made under related standards, is
248
plainly less than ideal.

2.

Regulations that Do Not Single Out or Distinguish Between
Types of Content on Their Face

As noted earlier, the Court normally determines that a regulation
which applies to a given speech activity regardless of content is content-neutral by sole reference to the fact that it does not draw content
distinctions. This is so despite the seeming ubiquity of the Ward standard that directs such neutrality to be assessed under a government
purpose standard. But the very fact that either standard is capable of
application in a given case despite the fact that the two standards
could easily point in different directions raises the same potential
problems of inconsistent and unprincipled application discussed in
connection with facially discriminatory regulations.
To take an extreme example, a city might justify a complete ban
on the use of its public square for demonstrations on the grounds it
received numerous complaints that anti-war demonstrations being
held there were unpatriotic. Under a facial standard, such a ban
would be content-neutral; under a government purpose test, it would
clearly be content-based since the ban was not unrelated to the content of the regulated speech activities. Indeed, in at least two of its
decisions involving speech regulations that did not distinguish between types of content on their face, an honest application of a facial
and government purpose test might have dictated different results re249
garding the findings of content neutrality in them.

248 Another problem with the government purpose test is what to do with a regulation when the government advances more than one purpose for it, especially when
one appears related to content and another does not. Although the Court has never
directly addressed this question, typically it appears to focus on the predominate purpose that the government seems to be asserting in a given case. See, e.g., United States
v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (speaking of "overriding justification" for regulation). But this approach only compounds the problems with the
government purpose test, because it permits the labeling of a restriction as contentneutral when it in fact may be supported, in part, by a substantial purpose related to
content. Such a result also seems to be in serious tension with its decisions where the
Court calls a regulation content-based using a facial discrimination test, no matter
how slight or narrow the differential treatment of content may be. See supra notes
135-41 and accompanying text.
249 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-88 (1988) (explaining that a ban on
residential picketing applied to abortion protestors in part to protect occupant
against communicative effects of speech); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
182-83 (1983) (holding that a ban on leafletting and picketing around the Court was
justified in part by potential communicative effects of speech on Justices).
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This problem aside, however, at least as to speech regulations that
do not make facial content distinctions, the Court does not seem to
have explicit facial and government purpose options that purportedly
coexist in some form of nebulous harmony with each other (as in
cases of facially discriminatory regulations). Moreover, at least the
Court appears to have formally adopted the best alternative out of
these choices of standards-a government purpose test-even if that
standard normally does not appear to be applied consistently in practice. A facial test for such regulations would present the opposite danger that such a test actually does present for selective content
restrictions. As illustrated above, that test would fail to detect many
truly content-based regulations in the same way that it indiscriminately treats all selective content regulations as being content250
based.
But this said, a government purpose standard as applied to nondiscriminatory speech regulations still suffers from many of the same
problems as discussed above for selective content restrictions. A test
of whether the regulation is unrelated to the content of the speech is
still a very imperfect proxy of illegitimate government motivation, and
can generally be satisfied more easily for facially neutral regulations.
For instance, the Boos communicative effects test for content neutrality seems to be virtually ignored when it comes to facially neutral regulations, even in the face of circumstances that seem to present such
concerns. 2 5 1 Lastly, the predominate purpose problem discussed in
connection with facially discriminatory regulations 252 is going to be
the same for both types of regulations when the government asserts
more than one purpose, and one seems related to content while another does not.
In sum, with respect to the most common form of speech regulation reviewed by the Court-those that on their face single out or
differentiate between types of content-its standards for ascertaining
the content neutrality of such regulations have been highly inconsistent and subject to results-driven applications. Considered in the context of a free speech jurisprudence that has virtually everything
turning on that determination, a doctrine that is characterized by
such traits is seriously troubling. At a more theoretical level, the basis
for characterizing a facially discriminatory regulation as content-neu250 But again, as discussed later, this indiscriminate treatment is not necessarily a
problem when a facial test for content-based restrictions is applied in the context of a
modified analytical approach. See infra Part III.B.
251 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
252

See supra note 248.
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tral-a phenomenon that only began occurring with the Court's decision in Renton and the subsequent extension of its reasoning-is
questionable in and of itself even though the results in many cases
may be sound. As to speech regulations that do not by their terms
make content distinctions, the Court has been more consistent about
the applicable test for content neutrality but does not rigorously apply
it in practice. Such regulations can present significant threats to the
freedom of expression which may go undetected by this uncritical
treatment, especially given the Court's overall lenient review of regulations deemed to be content-neutral.
III.

RETHINKING THE CONTENT APPROACH: LEARNING FROM

ExPREssIvE ASSOCIATION DOCTRINE, JUSTICE BREYER, AND
OTHER LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

A.

Importing Burden Analysis into Free Speech Doctrine

This Article has thus far identified and examined several major
problems with the Court's bicategorical content approach to protecting free expression, ones not surprising from a doctrine that seems
inordinately obsessed with the content treatment of a speech regulation. I have contended that this approach, even if the distinctions it
draws could be coherently defined and consistently applied, not only
is a poor method for addressing the Court's legitimate concerns about
improper government motivations, but fails adequately to take into
account the serious or minimal nature of the threat to First Amendment goals that a given regulation might pose. I have also argued that
the Court's standards for deciding whether a speech regulation will be
put to the content-based sword or treated with content-neutral kindness (or, perhaps, taken altogether out of this paradigm with some
sort of coping mechanism) are inherently flawed and seem to be inconsistently applied in a results-driven manner.
The obvious question becomes, then, is there a better constitutional approach to safeguarding the freedom of expression? Since the
Court long ago eschewed absolute protection for that freedom despite
the unqualified text of the Speech and Press Clauses, 253 any feasible
approach must allow that body to assess whether an alleged governmental infringement of a person's right of free expression is constitutionally permissible. At bottom, this should logically lead one to ask
253 Those clauses provide in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. As noted
earlier, however, neither the founders of the Constitution nor the Court has read this
prohibition literally. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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about the cause or reasons for that infringement (i.e., the government's interests, purposes, or motives) and its effect or impact on the
asserted right. The more important the reasons and the less serious
the effects, the more willing the Court would presumably be to sustain
the infringement and vice versa. Simply put, such an evaluation
should logically include an assessment of whether the government's
interests (the benefits to society) justify or warrant the claimed infringement (the costs to individual and societal interests of the First
Amendment). Of course, in situations presenting a significant risk
that the government's true motives did not match its asserted interests, concerns about illegitimate government motives might require
more proof of government need and less proof of an adverse impact
on expressive freedoms.
The main point is, however, that a sensible system of safeguarding expressive rights against unjustifiable government encroachments
would focus at its core on cause and effect (the reasons for a restriction and its effects on expressive rights), with some mechanism for
placing a more demanding burden of proof on the government to
justify its interests when the circumstances or evidence in a case present a significant risk of improper motivation. And since it is the freedom of expression that is guaranteed by the Constitution, and not the
government's right to abridge that freedom (the latter right being derived from more practical considerations) ,254 it plainly seems proper
to place the entire burden of persuasion on the government to show
that a given restriction is sufficiently important and that its scope of
application is appropriately tailored to achieve its interests. But this
raises the additional issue of just what burden of persuasion the government should bear.
As just mentioned, if the evidence or circumstances surrounding
a given regulation present a significant risk of improper motivation,
such as an asserted interest related to protecting people from harms
arising out of the communicative effects of offensive speech, for example, 255

the Court would be justified in imposing a stringent but attain-

able burden of persuasion on the government. Aside from such
situations, however, the key issue is what that burden should be as a
general rule for most cases. As I have argued, logic would seem to
dictate that cause and effect should have much to say about this: the
more important the government's asserted interests for a regulation,
and the less its impact on expressive freedoms, the lower the burden
would presumably need to be to justify it. Conversely, the less substan254
255

See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
See supra text accompanying notes 244-45.
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tial those interests appeared to be, and the greater the effects on expressive freedoms, the greater the government's burden should be.
Although one might not want to make this a one-for-one tradeoff-for
instance, one might reasonably weigh the effects on expressive freedoms more heavily in determining the government's burden of persuasion-it seems clear that those effects should be an important
consideration in that determination. At least that seems clear to the
Court in a closely related area of First Amendment law (the freedom
of expressive association), to Justice Breyer in a number of recent free
speech decisions, and to other liberal Western European countries
and Canada, whose laws, like those of the United States, are based on
25 6
a strong commitment to individual civil liberties.
Before getting to these three sources of comparison, however, it
is important to note how different the Court's current content approach is from the proposed system of analyzing free speech cases
outlined above. As observed earlier, that approach proceeds from a
foundational premise of distrust for governmental speech regulation.
In a basic free speech case, after asking the threshold question of
whether the government appears to have restricted expressive activities, the Court sets the government's burden of persuasion solely on
the basis of whether the regulation appears to be based on content
considerations as a method of guarding against illegitimate government control over expression. The Court does this by merely examining the regulation for any facial content discrimination, or by
assessing the relationship of the asserted governmental purpose to the
regulated speech's content. 257 Accordingly, except for the content
factor, current doctrine treats all alleged infringements on expressive
freedoms as equal by eschewing any analysis of a regulation's effects
on those freedoms in determining what the government's burden of
persuasion will be. And while risk of improper motivation is certainly
an important concern the Court should consider in setting that burden, to have such a concern as the exclusive driver of it seems inadequate. That inquiry not only needs to evaluate that risk, but just as
importantly, it needs to assess the effects or burdens the challenged
regulation appears to place on expressive freedoms.
Nor does current doctrine do much better at considering such
effects after the Court has determined the government's burden of
persuasion by choosing between content-based or content-neutral
treatment. It invariably strikes down regulations deemed content256 See infra notes 263-80 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this
issue.
257

See supra Part I.E.
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based despite how minor a burden or scope restriction they may place
on expressive freedoms and normally upholds ones deemed contentneutral as long as they do not appear to be excessively broad in
scope. 2 58 And even if one disagreed that the formal tests for contentbased and content-neutral review are woodenly applied towards their
designated outcomes, the content-based standard, at least, has no formal provision for assessing a regulation's effects. It simply asks
whether the government has asserted a compelling interest, and then
whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve it in the sense of
not burdening more speech than is necessary to achieve that interest. 259 So while this formulation may consider whether a regulation
unnecessarily burdens too much speech to achieve its goal, it utterly
fails to inquire about the degree of the burden a law necessarily places
on expressive freedoms to achieve its regulatory interests-no matter
how serious or minor that burden may be in a given case.
The standard content-neutral test, in cases where the Court properly applies it, at least inquires indirectly about a regulation's effects
on expressive freedoms in its requirement that such a regulation must
leave open ample alternative channels of communication regarding
the expression at issue. 2 60 However, there are a number of problems
with this inquiry, especially in the context of the Court's generally lax
content-neutral review. First, although it addresses the issue of a restriction's scope of operation-examining how many channels of
communications the regulation effects-it utterly ignores the extent
of burden a restriction might place on the affected channel or channels. So if heavy restrictions are placed on a popular channel of communication, the current standard fails to address this problem. More
importantly, this limited inquiry into the effects of a given regulation
comes too late, almost as an afterthought in current doctrine. As discussed above, an inquiry into the effects of a regulation on expressive
freedoms is vital to choosing the proper standard of review in the first
place. If, in a given case, a truly content-neutral regulation places severe restrictions on certain popular media of communication, or simply burdens too many channels of communication, that should be an
important consideration that ratchets up the standard of review. As it
is now, only the latter concern would formally be considered under
the current test, and only belatedly after the regulation has been slot258
259

See supra Part I.C. and Part I.D.
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981); supra text accompanying note

60.
260 See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Conciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981);
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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ted into the Court's lenient content-neutral review framework. This
raises the problems discussed earlier that even this limited inquiry
into effects will not be taken as seriously or objectively as it should.
How, then, should free speech doctrine be reformed to address
the foregoing problems? At the most basic and obvious level, if the
Court is going to employ different standards of review to assess the
constitutionality of different categories of speech regulations, it ought
to apply them in a meaningful way-without the virtually insurmountable presumptions of invalidity or validity that appear to be associated
with them today. Otherwise, one might as well dispense with any pretext of categorical balancing (of either the stringent or deferential
form) and simply have hard and fast categorical rules. But categorical
balancing seems to be the more preferable approach, from a "categories" perspective because an ability to adjust the government's burden
of persuasion depending on the threat to free expression posed by a
given regulation seems desirable, and from a "balancing" perspective
because even within those "threat levels" having some flexibility to assess the government's needs for a regulation seems essential. At a
more basic level, it is also important for the Court to "mean what it
says" and "say what it means" to simply promote respect and avoid
cynicism for its decisions.
Once it has been decided to have an analytical structure that correlates the government's burden of persuasion with certain categories
or characteristics of speech regulations, however, it must then be decided what those categories or characteristics will be. Certainly
whether the government is treating one type or types of expressive
content differently than others should be an important factor in determining the burden of justification and drafting precision it must
meet,26 1 but it should not be the only one as it is under current doctrine. Not only should that determination also take into account the
specific character of any content regulation that may exist and
whether circumstances indicate a significant risk of improper motivation in a given case, 26 2 but as argued above, it should expressly take
into account the character and level of the burden that a regulation
appears to impose on the exercise of expressive freedoms. The
higher that burden in terms of its degree or breadth, the higher the
government's burden should be in justifying a restriction's purpose
and scope of application; conversely, the lower such burdens on exer261 In addition to concerns about improper motivation, as the Court explained in
Mosley content distinctions raise basic issues of equal protection. See Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1972).
262 See infra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
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cising expressive freedoms are, the lower the government's burden of
justification should be.
Oddly, but sensibly, an emphasis on the burden that a regulation
imposes on the exercise of the asserted constitutional right in determining the government's own burden of persuasion is exactly the approach the Court takes in an area of law that is the closest imaginable
to free expression law-the law governing the freedom of expressive
association. This varying approach is odd because there appears to be
no compelling basis for having constitutional rules to protect the freedom of expressive association that are different from those used to
protect the freedom of expression. The former right is a child of the
latter right. Nowhere does the First Amendment (or any other part of
the Bill of Rights or U.S. Constitution) provide for a "freedom of association." That freedom is only recognized as a First Amendment freedom because it is conduct that directly facilitates or enhances
expression. 26 3 That is presumably why the Court has, in more recent
times, taken more care to call it the "freedom of expressive association." 264 It is given recognition as an ancillary free speech right because without the freedom to associate for expressive purposes, the
freedom of expression would not be as meaningful and fulfilling. Any
burden that a law might place on expressive association freedoms is
ultimately a problem because of the burden it imposes on expressive
265
freedoms.
When a regulation is alleged to violate a person's expressive association rights, after the Court determines as a threshold matter that
the regulation does appear to restrict or burden associative activities
that are undertaken for expressive purposes, the key question it asks
in determining whether to apply a strict or more lenient standard of
scrutiny to it is whether the burden the regulation imposes on expressive association freedoms appears to be "severe" or of a "lesser" nature. 266 Additionally, the standards of review it applies in such cases
263 See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, The FirstAmendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards a Realistic Right To Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. LJ.
249, 260-61 (2004).
264 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
265 See id. at 655 ("An association must merely engage in expressive activity that could
be impaired in order to be entitled to protection." (emphasis added)).
266 See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029, 2035 (2005) ("Regulations that
impose severe burdens on associational rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest ....
However, when regulations impose lesser burdens, a
'State's important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.'" (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,

520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997))).
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2 67
are very similar to those used for ordinary free expression cases.
The main difference, then, between the Court's approach to free expression and freedom of expressive association cases is that in the former the government's burden of persuasion turns solely on whether it
has based its regulation on expressive content, and in the latter it
turns solely on the degree of burden the regulation has imposed on
2 68
expressive association freedoms.
These starkly contrasting, one-dimensional approaches to making
the critical decision regarding the government's burden of justification for impairing expressive or expressive association rights appear to
make little sense. If the main concern in both sets of cases is whether
the government's reasons for impairing expressive activities justifies
those impairments, and one is sensibly attempting to determine what
burden ofjustification the government will bear, it would seem logical
to consider the risk of improper content motivation and the degree of
the burden placed on those activities in both types of cases. While an
extended analysis of the problems with not making content concerns
an important factor to consider in selecting the level of review in expressive association cases is beyond the scope of this Article, certainly
those cases at least illustrate the sense of making burden assessments
an important factor for making that selection in more ordinary freedom of expression cases.
Indeed, in several recent cases of the latter type, Justice Breyer
has emphasized the manifest sense of considering the burden a
speech regulation places on expressive freedoms in deciding whether
to uphold or strike down that regulation. For instance, in two recent
cases where the Court struck down laws requiring that commercial
distributors of sexually explicit materials take certain measures to prevent children from being exposed to them, Justice Breyer wrote the
principal dissents.2 69 Interestingly, in each one, he began his analysis
by noting his agreement with the majority's application of strict scrutiny to the content-based regulations as required by current doc-

267 See id.
268 It should be noted that in at least one area of free speech law-the right to
vote-the Court employs an approach that is very similar to its approach in expressive
association cases. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (setting the
standard of review based on the degree of burden a regulation imposes on the right
to vote). While this may be explained by the Court's tendency to view such cases as
involving both speech and expressive association interests, the point remains that if
the Court can use such an approach in an area of core political speech, it certainly
should be considered for use as to its review of speech regulations in general.
269 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 676-91 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 835-47 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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trine. 270
However, he then preceded his arguments that the
government satisfied that standard with admonitions that it had to be
applied in a manner that kept in mind the modest burdens the regula2 71
tions imposed on expressive freedoms.
As a matter of logic and reason, Justice Breyer was certainly correct that the modesty of those burdens should have been a significant
factor in the majority's evaluation of the pertinent regulations. A major problem with his argument, however, was that it lacked foundation
in current doctrine as was evident by his lack of citations to precedent
supporting it.2 7 2 Moreover, his argument that the minimal nature of
the regulations' burdens should have provided a mere backdrop by
which to apply strict scrutiny lacked analytical force and appeal. How
was such a vague principle to be consistently applied in practice? And
how strict can scrutiny be when it is being applied against background
factors counseling a more lenient review? While Justice Breyer was on
the right track, what he should have been urging was a basic change in
free speech doctrine-by analogy to expressive association doctrine if
nothing else-that explicitly provides for the consideration of the effects a regulation has on expressive freedoms as an integral component of the analysis, rather than as an amorphous background factor.
Moreover, as argued earlier, that consideration should take place at
the outset of the Court's analysis in determining the appropriate standard of persuasion the government must meet, rather than merely
hovering in the background hoping to color the application of standards of scrutiny that are applied mechanically in any event.
A final source of lessons for American free speech doctrine regarding the consideration of a regulation's effects on expressive freedoms in determining its constitutionality is the free speech law of
other liberal Western democracies committed to protecting those
freedoms. And such a comparative source is especially pertinent now
at a time when the Court is exhibiting an increasing willingness to
look to international sources of authority as a tool for assisting it with
270 See ACLU, 542 U.S. at 676-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Playboy, 529 U.S. at
835-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
271 See ACLU, 542 U.S. at 682-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Playboy, 529 U.S. at
838-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For an expansive discussion of Justice Breyer's free
speech jurisprudence by the Justice himself, including his belief that the Court's standard of scrutiny in particular cases should be defined more by reference to the "facilitating self-government" purposes of the First Amendment and less by "category
boundaries that are too rigid or fixed . . . and too mechanical[ly]" applied, see his
recent book entitled Active Liberty. STEPHEN BREvER, AcTrvE LIBERTY 39-55 (2005).
272 See ACLU, 542 U.S. at 682-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Playboy, 529 U.S. at
838-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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constitutional interpretation.2 73 The free speech law embodied in the
European Convention on Human Rights274 (to which all major Western European countries have acceded) and that of Canada, for instance, generally eschew any sort of rigid doctrinal categories based
on whether the government has regulated the content of speech.
The general approach embodied in both sets of laws is remarkably similar. Like the U.S. Bill of Rights, both the European Convention and the Canadian Constitution declare that freedom of
expression is a protected right.275 The right is read broadly by the
European Court of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court,
respectively, to cover all forms of human expression irrespective of its
content or subject matter.2 7 6 Unlike the U.S. Constitution, however,
both documents expressly declare that that right is subject to certain
limitations that are "necessary" or can be "demonstrably justified" in a
"democratic society." 277 Thus, when the constitutionality of a speech
273 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-79 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 576-78 (2003).
274 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
275 Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights states that
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers." Id. art. 10(1). The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that "[e]veryone has the following fundamental freedoms: ... freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication." CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 2(b).
276 See, e.g., PETER W. HoGC, I CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 40.5(a), at 40-10
(4th ed., loose-leaf 2002) (discussing broad definition of protected expression); see
also id. § 40.5(d), at 40-11 (asserting that "content neutrality is the governing principle of the Supreme Court of Canada's definition of expression," and that the "content
of a statement cannot deprive it of the protection accorded by s. 2(b) no matter how
offensive it may be"); CLARE OvEy & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE, EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 276-77 (3rd ed. 2002) (stating that "[t]he right to
freedom of expression . . . is extremely broad. All forms of expression are included,
through any medium . . . and with any content, including racist hate speech and
pornography"). At the outset, the approach of protecting all types of expressive content distinguishes European and Canadian law from U.S. law, since the latter declares
that certain types of content are not deserving of constitutional protection. See supra
notes 150-51 and accompanying text. However, as Hogg observes regarding Canadian law, "[i] f the Court regards a particular kind of expression as of little value, then
this makes the objective of limiting a law easier to justify, and invites more relaxed
standards of proportionality." See HOGG, supra, § 40.5(d), at 40-13 (2001). Undoubtedly the same is true for European law as well.
277 Article 10(2) of the European Convention states that
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As part of the weighing process, these courts generally inquire
first into whether the government's interests are sufficiently important
to warrant the claimed infringement on expressive rights, and, if so,
whether the restriction is a proportionate response to the asserted
need in terms of restricting no more speech than is necessary.2 79 Implicit in these assessments of importance and proportionality is an
evaluation of the effect the challenged restriction has on expressive
freedoms, both in terms of the degree of the burden imposed on
those rights and, at times, the importance of the expression at issue
(i.e., its content).28 0 Thus, not only do these general balancing ap[t]he exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 274, art. 10(2). The Canadian
Charter provides that it "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society." CANADIAN CHARTER OF RiGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 1.
278 See, e.g., HOGG, supra note 276, § 35.12, at 35-39 to -40 (2002); OvN' & WHITE,
supra note 276 at 5, 209-10, 278-79, 289.
279 See HOGG, supra note 276, § 35.8(b), at 35-16 to -17 (1997); id. § 40.2, at 40-6
(1999); OVEY & WHITE, supra note 276, at 201, 209-10.
280 See HocC, supra note 276, § 35.8(b), at 35-16 (1997) (explaining that a step in
the applicable analysis requires "a proportionality between the effects of the measures
which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom [ ] and the objective
which has been identified as of sufficient importance" (quoting R. v. Oakes [1986]
S.C.R. 103, 138-39)); id. § 35.12, at 35-39 to -40 (2002) (noting his belief that this step
effectively subsumed in other parts of the analysis); id. § 40.5(d), at 40-11 to -13
(2002) (discussing how even though all content is considered protected expression,
the Supreme Court of Canada often upholds content-based restrictions in the balancing stage of analysis and does not consider "'all expression [to be] equally worthy of
protection'" (quoting R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, 760)); OVEY & WHITE, supra
note 276, at 209 (asserting that the proportionality test "requires the Court to balance
the severity of the restriction placed on the individual against the importance of the
public interest"); id. at 279 (observing that the "Court consistently gives a higher level
of protection to publications and speech which contribute towards social and political
debate, criticism and information-in the broadest sense. Artistic and commercial
expression, in contrast, receive a lower level of protection"); see also David Feldman,
Content Neutrality, in IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ExPRESSION IN BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE

U.S.A. 139, 156-58 (Ian Loveland ed., 1998)
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proaches provide more latitude to assess the threat to expressive freedoms posed by a given speech regulation, the nature of the content
being restricted (and the good or harm it can cause) is a factor such
courts often take into account in evaluating that threat. Although an
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of such balancing approaches relative to the more categorical orientation of U.S. law is
beyond the scope of this Article, it is informative that the latter's heavy
content focus, to the virtual exclusion of burden analysis, appears to
be relatively anomalous in the free expression systems of other Western democracies.
In sum, related free expression doctrine, Justice Breyer's incompletely articulated opinions, and comparative constitutional law all
point strongly towards making the magnitude of burden a speech regulation places on expressive freedoms an important component of
free speech analysis in this country. Making such a burden assessment
an important factor in selecting the government's own burden of persuasion for imposing a speech regulation would constitute a big step
towards curing the major deficiencies of the present content approach. Most importantly, it would require the Court to temper its
overarching concern with improperly motivated speech regulationsthat is, its distrust for government action in this area-in setting the
government's burden of justification, and allow other important considerations to influence that key decision.
This alone would go a long way towards rectifying one big problem with current doctrine: the way it strikes down any regulation characterized as being content-based despite how minor a burden it might
impose or how narrow its scope of application, and how it normally
upholds any regulation characterized as content-neutral despite how
heavy a burden it might place on a medium of expression as long as
suitable alternative methods may be said to exist. Such a modification
to doctrine would also have another salient effect. It would allow the
Court to stop stretching its standards for labeling a regulation as content-based or content-neutral, at least when the concerns driving such
efforts have to do with the Court's perception that the restriction at
issue poses a minor burden on expressive freedoms.
(discussing the balancing approach under the European Convention and noting that
"[t]he jurisprudence of the European Court and the Commission on Human Rights
allows some content-based restrictions on speech so long as they fall within the justifications set out for interfering with expression set out in Article 10(2) of the Convention"); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6-10, 21-22, 25 (1992) (comparing and contrasting Canadian
and American free speech jurisprudence and observing that the principle of "content
discrimination carr[ies] much less importance in Canada than in the United States").
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Refining the Content Approach

This is not to say that the differential content treatment of a regulation becomes irrelevant under the doctrinal modifications I am proposing. Indeed, for reasons to be explained shortly, such treatment
would remain an important factor to also be considered in determining the government's burden of persuasion in a given case. However,
the content neutrality analysis needs to be changed in several important respects. First and most obviously, one unitary standard, applied
in a consistent and principled manner, should govern the determination as to whether a given regulation is content-based or content-neutral. That standard should first ask whether a regulation, on its face,
singles out or makes distinctions between different types of content or
applies evenly to all types. If the former, it should be regarded as
content-based without further inquiry. If the latter, as under current
doctrine, it should be regarded as content-neutral unless it is supported by a justification that is related to content-in which case it
28 1
should be regarded as content-based.
There are a couple of good reasons for treating facially discriminatory regulations as content-based without further inquiry into government purpose, despite the drawbacks to such an approach
discussed earlier. 28 2 Initially, to call a selective content regulation
"content-neutral" following a further inquiry into government purpose creates substantial dissonance between that phrase and a common sense understanding of those terms. More significantly, while a
government purpose inquiry is designed to ferret out improper motivation, as noted above even a properly motivated content regulationprovided it places a significant burden on a speaker's ability to express
certain ideas or information-has a greater potential than contentneutral regulations for having adverse effects on the marketplace of
ideas (or otherwise doing injury to basic free speech objectives). Further, as argued earlier, the "unrelated to content" test of the government purpose standard is a poor tool for ferreting out illegitimate
government motivation. Lastly, when a law treats selected content in a
manner different than other types, equal protection considerations
favor a characterization scheme that flags such differential treatment
for at least some heightened level of review (as I propose below). Accordingly, a regulation that draws content distinctions on its face
should be considered content-based, at least for the purpose of con281 This was essentially the Court's pre-Renton approach to determining the content status of a given speech regulation, even though it did not articulate it clearly.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
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sidering the application of heightened review to it because of the special risks it can pose to free expression.
Since facially content-neutral regulations generally have less potential than content-based ones for skewing the marketplace of ideas
and otherwise harming basic First Amendment objectives (provided
they do not impose substantial burdens on key avenues of expression), but still have the capacity for being the product of improper
motivation, a government purpose inquiry in addition to the initial
facial characterization of a regulation is appropriate. Such an inquiry
might at least uncover clear content discrimination, such as the ban,
which I hypothesized earlier, on using a park for demonstrations or
rallies that was triggered by war protests.

28 3

Once a regulation is characterized as content-based or contentneutral under the foregoing standard, however, the analysis to determine the government's burden of persuasion does not end as it does
under current doctrine. Rather, the content evaluation continues
with respect to content-based regulations to assess further the risk of
improper motivation, and for both content-based and content-neutral
regulations a burden assessment is conducted. Such an overall analysis could conceivably yield four different standards of scrutiny or burdens of persuasion to place on the government to justify a given
regulation, although I am not advocating a rigid adherence to the
specific standards I am suggesting. The main point is that the government's burden of persuasion would increase in the presence of cer28 4
tain factors and decrease in the presence of others.
If, for example, a court were to determine that a given regulation
is content-based because it draws a content distinction on its face, to
further assess the risk of improper motivation it should ask about the
specific nature of that distinction. Certainly a viewpoint or narrow
subject matter restriction would be a substantial cause for concern
from a motives perspective, 28 5 and combined with a substantial burden or effects concern-e.g., a ban or serious burden on speaking, or
283 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
284 One commentator has recently proposed replacing the content approach with
a system that varies the government's burden of persuasion based on a multitude of
factors that have been suggested in various opinions by Justice Stevens, and then engaging in an overall balancing of these factors to decide free speech cases. See Wilson
R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based and ContentNeutral: The Emerging ConstitutionalCalculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 846-54, 860-61 (2004).
In my view, such a multi-factorial balancing approach would be more unwieldy, and
perhaps result in more inconsistent and unprincipled decisions, than the existing
content approach.
285 See Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions, supra note 3, at 100-15.
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a moderate burden with a broad scope of application-a court would
be justified in subjecting such a regulation to an almost per se invalidation similar to what the Court does today for any regulation it
designates as content-based. In such a situation, only the most stringent standard of need and drafting precision would suffice to justify
such a regulation (call it "strict scrutiny on steroids"), if ever it could
be.
On the other hand, if such a facially discriminatory regulation
consisted of a more general subject matter classification that seemed
to be tied to a legitimate regulatory goal (i.e., it did not present substantial motives concerns), but still posed substantial effects concerns,
a court might want to apply a version of strict scrutiny in a way that the
language of that test suggests (call it "true strict scrutiny"). That is,
the government would be required to demonstrate a compelling interest and that it employed the least speech restrictive alternative that
could as reasonably and effectively achieve those interests. The government's burden would be high but not virtually impossible to attain,
as under the Court's current application of this test. This same standard of review might also be appropriate to evaluate facially contentneutral regulations that the government justifies by reference to a
content-related purpose. The fact that the government is using an
indirect or even surreptitious means of restricting certain content
might give cause for substantial motives concerns. On the other
hand, the fact that the government is willing to face a political risk for
restricting all speech expressed under the time, place, manner, or
other circumstances covered by the regulation, might mitigate in
favor of applying regular strict scrutiny instead of the more stringent
variety.
Next, if a facially discriminatory regulation were to present less
than substantial motives and burden concerns (but still presented
some concerns along these lines just by virtue of its content-based
character), or one was dealing with a true content-neutral regulation
(i.e., it was both facially neutral and reasonably justified by a purpose
unrelated to content) that presented substantial effects concerns because of its heavy burden on certain expressive activities or its wide
scope of application to a variety of those activities, a court might wish
to apply a genuinely intermediate or moderate standard of review that
seriously questions the asserted government interests and its method
of achieving them. 28 6 The Court has already applied a version of such

a test in a couple of cases where it consciously strove for a standard of
review somewhere between its current version of strict scrutiny and its
286

See, e.g., Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 3, at 52.
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more deferential Ward test for content-neutral review, asking whether
a regulation "burdens more speech than is necessary to serve a significant government interest." 2 7 As this standard suggests, the government does not necessarily have the highest burden of persuasion with
respect to the need for a particular restriction, but it still must show
that it is important and that it used the least speech restrictive alternative that would just as reasonably and effectively achieve that interest.
Finally, for true content-neutral restrictions that pose moderate
to low effects or burden concerns, it might be appropriate to apply
something along the lines of the Ward standard of review, which simply asks whether a regulation is supported by a significant interest, is
narrowly tailored to achieve it in terms of constituting a reasonable fit
between the regulation's scope and that interest, and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication for the expression at issue. 28 8 As demonstrated earlier, and as leading scholars have
observed, such a standard tends to be deferential to the government
28 9
in actual application.
In sum, setting the government's burden of persuasion to justify
speech regulations based on both motives considerations and the burden or effects that they appear to have on expressive freedoms seems
to be a more sensible and effective approach to assessing the regulation's constitutionality than the Court's current all-or-nothing method
that focuses solely on questionable content characterizations. Additionally, making more nuanced evaluations of the risk of improper
motivation based on considerations such as the facial content characteristics of a given regulation, the nature or type of a content classification, and the presence or absence of extrinsic circumstances that
might indicate such motives, yields a more consistent and principled
approach to assessing that risk.
C. Applying the Proposed Approach to Mosley, Renton, and Hill
Given these proposals for better analyzing speech regulations and
addressing the major problems with the Court's bicategorical content
approach in this area, it remains to demonstrate. how they would apply
in practice. I will seek to do this in the factual context of three important decisions in the creation and evolution of that approach: Mosley,
which laid the foundation for it; Renton, which significantly altered it;
287 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 374 (1997) (applying
standard of review first developed in Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S.
753 (1994)).
288 See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
289 See, e.g., Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 3, at 50.
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and Hill, which presented a recent and stark illustration of its difficulties. Under my proposed approach, as an initial and quite simple matter, the speech regulation at issue in each of these cases would be
considered content-based because they all made content distinctions
on their face: in Mosley the regulation barred all picketing next to
schools during their operating hours except for peaceful labor picketing; 290 in Renton it barred adult movie theatres from being located
within a certain distance of other places; 2 9 1 and in Hill, among other
things, it barred anyone from approaching within eight feet of another person going into an abortion clinic for the purpose of "protest,
education, or counseling."

' 29 2

Once the regulations have been determined to be content-based,
we know that the government's burden of persuading the Court that
the regulation at issue was sufficiently important and crafted will not
be set at a deferential level in any of these cases, given the inherent
risk of improper motivation and impairing effects posed by selective
content restrictions. But in order to determine which heightened
standard of review will be applied, it is necessary to examine further
the specific nature of the differential content treatment contained in
the regulation and the nature of the burden it imposes on expressive
rights.
In Mosley, the favorable treatment accorded to peaceful labor
picketing, or, conversely, the restrictive treatment accorded to all
other picketing, was based on general subject matter distinctions and
no evidence or circumstances seemed to indicate that the government
was attempting to favor union views or disfavor views associated with
racial discrimination or other sorts of protests.

29 3

Nonetheless, the

subject matter distinction drawn was relatively narrow considered in
relation to all the types of picketing that were restricted, indicating a
nonnegligible risk of improper motivation. As to effects or burden,
the scope of the restriction was relatively minor-no picketing around
schools during their operating hours. This would be unlikely to prevent the views or ideas of nonlabor protestors, such as those protesting
racial discrimination in schools, from entering the arena of public debate. At the same time, however, such protests were bound to be most
effective in getting public attention when done near schools when the
alleged discriminators were present at them. Such proximate protests
290 See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92-95 (1972).
291 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43-46 (1986).
292 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 704 (2000); see supra note 225 and accompanying text.
293 Mosley, 408 U.S. 592; see supra note 235.
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would likely also be more effective in serving the social dissent and
self-fulfillment objectives of the First Amendment. Thus, the burden
on expressive freedoms did not appear to be especially severe or minor; rather, it seemed significant.
Accordingly, under the approach outlined above, it seems that a
true level of strict scrutiny (i.e., devoid of the heavy presumption of
invalidity) would be appropriate. And regardless of whether preventing disruption in schools could be considered a compelling state interest or not, it is clear that the selective restriction used by the
government was not the least speech restrictive alternative to reasonably and effectively achieve its interests. That would have been a ban
only on any sort of nonpeaceful picketing, allowing for most forms of
peaceful picketing. But the virtue of this approach over that used by
the Court in Mosley is that it does a better job at assessing the real
interests at stake rather than creating doctrine that may have provided
for the correct result there, but generated inflexible and unworkable
rules by which to analyze most other free speech cases.
Renton also involved a general subject matter restriction-one
that covered sexually explicit adult films. 2

94

That regulation seemed

to pose a significant risk of improper motivation, both because the
regulated content was regarded as being offensive or of "low value" by
many, and because the burden imposed on that expression seemed
significant-the regulation effectively restricted such theaters to approximately five percent of the available land in the city, much of
which was already occupied. 295 Although the government was able to
point to the legitimate regulatory goal of addressing neighborhood
ills associated with such content, the extremely restrictive manner it
chose to do so still raised significant motive concerns in addition to
the actual burden imposed. Thus, as in Mosely, it appears that it would
have been appropriate to test the restriction with an unbiased application of strict scrutiny.
Employing that analysis, it seems clear that the government
would have a compelling interest in seeking to reduce neighborhood
crime and blight in the abstract, but the real question was whether the
presence of adult theatres were the cause of such. Under this heightened level of review, the government would need to adduce more
proof of that relationship than the Court required in the actual
case. 296 Moreover, even if this relationship could be demonstrated,
294 See Renton, 475 U.S. 41; see supra text accompanying notes 106-09.
295 See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54.
296 See id. at 50-52 (allowing the City of Renton, Washington to rely on Seattle's
experience with adult theatres to establish the need for its regulation).
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the questions remained whether the distance restriction imposed in
that case would actually further those objectives and to what extent,
and whether there were less speech restrictive alternatives that would
have just as reasonably and effectively achieved those interests. Here,
this would have required a new trial on the merits to consider evidence and expert testimony on these questions. Accordingly, it is not
clear whether the proposed analysis would have dictated the same result as the Court reached in Renton, but it does clearly avoid the necessity of creating a legal fiction wherein a clearly content-based
regulation is called "content-neutral"-and avoids all the problems associated with such an approach.
Finally, both the facial character and circumstances surrounding
29 7
the "protest, education, or counseling" restrictions at issue in Hil
clearly indicated that the government was concerned about the content of the speech being directed at abortion clinic patients. What was
less clear was whether it was mainly concerned with the viewpoint of
the abortion protestors, or the communicative effects of that speech
on the patients combined with the manner in which it was delivered.
But again, the limited nature of the burden the restriction imposedrequiring protestors to deliver their message eight feet away from a
patient rather than in close physical proximity2 9 8-strongly pointed to
the latter concern, and thus a fairly low risk of improper motive.
Moreover, assessing independently the nature of the burden the restriction imposed on expressive freedoms, it would not be fair to characterize it as minor from the speakers' perspectives as they were
prevented from passing written materials to patients and engaging in
a normal form of conversation with them. At the same time, however,
such speakers were plainly able to deliver their basic messages to their
intended listeners, and it was extremely doubtful any patient that was
not open to receiving those messages would have been made more so
by a close physical approach-indeed, the chances are such approaches would have caused those patients to put up emotional defenses making them even less likely to consider the substantive
content of the message.
In short, the risk of improper motives seemed low, and the burden imposed on expressive freedoms seemed significant but not extreme-thus indicating a truly intermediate level of persuasive burden
for the government. Applying this standard, there is little question
that the government interest in protecting personal privacy and
guarding against the undue emotional distress of patients was fairly
297 530 U.S. at 704.
298 Id. at 707.
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characterizable as significant or important. Moreover, an eight foot
approach restriction seemed to be the least speech restrictive alternative of reasonably and effectively achieving that interest-indeed, it
seemed to be a reasonable compromise of the competing interests.
Thus, the approach proposed in this Article reaches the same sensible
result as the Court in Hill, but without having to resort to a legal fiction of content neutrality and engendering acrimonious disputes between different Justices about that nonissue. At the least, the
approach proposed herein would focus the Justices' energy and analytical efforts on the real and important points of contention to be
addressed in such a case.
CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to evaluate the merits of the content approach to implementing the free speech guarantee of the First
Amendment as the Court has conceived and shaped that doctrine
over the three decades of its life. It concludes that although such an
approach was a well intentioned effort to stave off instances of improper government censorship and control over the marketplace of
public debate, it has taken on a life of its own in many ways divorced
from these original concerns. The rigid and woodenly applied analytical framework it has devolved into actually threatens a healthy and
vibrant system of free expression, because it renders the government
powerless to address content-related problems with certain types of
expression and unduly empowers it to threaten that system in noncontent related ways. It has also caused the Court to develop and employ
often inconsistent, unprincipled, or ad hoc rules to allow it to reach
common sense results in many cases where those results would otherwise be elusive under current doctrine. It is hoped that the new approach proposed herein will at least be a step towards implementing a
more sensible free speech analysis that preserves the best parts of the
content approach, while discarding its more problematic aspects.

